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REFERENCE COMPARISON AND DECISION MAKING 
Effects of Reference Point Salience on Decision Making Under Risk 
 
Decision making theories were originally built around the assumption that individual’s decisions are mainly 
dependent on the monetary outcomes of the decider. This paper explores whether social comparison and 
controlling the salience of social comparison can change evaluation of choices and preference for risk. The 
hypothesis is that they can. Early expected utility models modeled risk aversion by assigning different 
shapes to an individual’s utility function. The relatively simple structure of the expected utility model 
provided a readily understandable tool for predicting decision making under risk. It also contained some 
problems related to the underlying assumptions which the model was based on. Later developments in 
economic decision making theory aimed to solve the observed problems and include more factors in to the 
models. Prospect theory and social preferences models are among these developments in decision making 
theory. Decision making, as described by these models, can also depend on results attained by other 
people. Psychological research on decision making has a longer line of research and can contribute more to 
reference person selection, effects of emotions and social pressure. This paper will present two economic 
decision making theories, relevant for the subject of social comparison and risk taking, and provide 
additional review of relevant psychological research. In addition to the literature review, a hypothetical 
experiment, plausible results and possible implications are discussed in the end.  
 
FINDINGS 
Prospect theory and social preferences model include a reference person in the evaluation of an outcome 
and provide a modeling possibility for estimating how these reference persons could affect decision making. 
Both models predict that increasing the salience of a reference person’s outcomes and comparison will 
change risk taking in individuals. In prospect theory, salience is predicted to moderate the perceived 
distance to a reference point. Increasing salience of social comparison is expected to increase the perceived 
difference to reference point. In social preferences model, the outcome of a reference person is included in 
the utility function and the parameters are expected to react to changing salience conditions. Changing 
parameters would change marginal utility of the utility function altering predicted risk preferences. 
Psychological research helps further understand how reference persons are selected, what effects 
emotions and social pressure can have. Reference people are selected mainly due to the fact that people 
have a need to evaluate their actions and in some fields finding a suitable measure is difficult. In subjective 
situations, other people provide a convenient way to measure ones abilities and success. Findings in 
research on social pressure support the hypothesis and include support on the moderating effect of 
salience on risk taking. Finally, previous research on emotions does not provide any conclusive evidence for 
or against the hypothesis. The prominent theories on emotions are presented and possible effects of each 
are accounted for when discussing possible results and implications. 
 
Keywords: Decision making, risk aversion, social preferences, prospect theory, social pressure, gambling, 
reference group, reference person 
2 
 
      TIIVISTELMÄ 
      Joulukuu 2011 
 
Päätöksentekoteoriat pohjautuivat alun perin oletukselle, että yksilöt tekevät arvioivat päätösten 
paremmuutta ainoastaan eri vaihtoehtojen rahallisten seuraamusten avulla. Tämän katsauksen 
lähtökohtana on tutkia sosiaalisen vertailun, ja tämän vertailun näkyvyyden, vaikutusta päätöksentekoon ja 
epävarmuuden sietämiseen rahallisten seuraamusten lisäksi. Hypoteesin mukaan, näillä seikoilla on tärkeä 
rooli päätöksiä tehtäessä. Odotetun hyödyn teoria mallintaa riskinottoa olettamalla, että olemassa on 
erimuotoisia hyötyfunktioita. Teorian rakenne onkin yksinkertainen, auttaen ymmärtämään miten eri 
päätöksiä voidaan arvioida epävarmuutta sisältävissä tilanteissa. Taustaoletukset osoittautuivat kuitenkin 
pian teorian julkistamisen jälkeen ongelmallisiksi, mikä johti ongelmia korjaavien, vaihtoehtoisten 
teorioiden kehittämiseen. Myöhemmät päätöksentekomallit ja -teoriat pyrkivät ratkaisemaan odotetun 
hyödyn teoriassa havaittuja epäkohtia ja myös sisällyttämään arviointiin lisää, rahallisesta lopputilanteesta 
riippumattomia kriteereitä. Prospektiteoria ja sosiaalisten preferenssien mallit on kehitetty vastaamaan 
odotetun teorian ongelmiin ja sisällyttämään lisäkriteereitä arviointiin. Yksi olennaisimmista lisäkriteereistä 
on toisten henkilöiden huomioiminen päätösten paremmuuden arvioinnissa. Psykologisella tutkimuksella 
on pidemmät perinteet sosiaalisen vertailun, päätöksentekoon vaikuttavien tunteiden ja sosiaalisen 
paineen vaikutusten tutkimuksessa. Tässä paperissa esitellään tarkemmin prospektiteoria, sosiaalisten 
preferenssien mallit ja sosiaalisen vertailun kannalta tärkeät psykologisen tutkimuksen osa-alueet. 
Kirjallisuuskatsauksen lisäksi, lopussa on kuvattu sosiaalisen vertailun vaikutusta epävarmuutta sisältävään 
päätöksentekoon tutkiva hypoteettinen koeasetelma. Viimeinen osio sisältää keskustelua mahdollisista 
tuloksista ja niiden merkityksestä. 
 
LÖYDÖKSET 
Sekä prospektiteoriassa, että sosiaalisen preferenssien mallissa on mahdollista ottaa huomioon 
referenssihenkilön vaikutus päätöksentekoon ja arvioida tämän vaikutuksen seurauksia. Molemmat mallit 
ennustavat referenssihenkilön lopputulosten näkyvyyden lisäämisen muuttavan yksilöiden epävarmuuden 
sietämisen tasoa. Prospektiteoriassa sosiaalinen vertailun näkyvyyden lisäämisen odotetaan kasvattavan 
koettua etäisyyttä henkilön referenssipisteeseen. Sosiaalisten preferenssien mallissa, referenssihenkilön 
lopputulos kuuluu hyötyfunktioon ja näkyvyyden vaihtumisen odotetaan vaikuttavan hyötyfunktion 
parametreihin. Odotettavasti, hyötyfunktion parametrit muuttuvat näkyvyyden muuttuessa, vaikuttaen 
yksilön riskipreferensseihin. 
Psykologian tutkimus auttaa syvällisemmin ymmärtämään kuinka referenssihenkilöt valitaan ja millaisia 
vaikutuksia sosiaalisesta vertailusta syntyvillä tunteilla, sekä sosiaalisesta paineesta, voi olla 
päätöksentekoon. Referenssihenkilön päätarkoitus on helpottaa ihmisten omien ominaisuuksien arviointia 
asioissa, joissa objektiivisen vertailun suorittaminen on vaikeaa. Sopiva referenssihenkilö toimii hyvin 
mittapuuna ja omien ominaisuuksien subjektiivisen arvioinnin välineenä. Sosiaalisen paineen 
tutkimustulokset tukevat tutkimuksen hypoteesia ja tarjoavat todisteita sosiaalisen vertailun näkyvyyden 
merkityksestä. Tunteiden vaikutuksesta epävarmuuden sietämiseen ei ole yhtenäisiä lopputuloksia. 
Tunteiden vaikutuksiin liittyvät pääteoriat esitetään teoriakatsauksessa ja näiden teorioiden ennustukset 
otetaan huomioon mahdollisista lopputuloksista keskusteltaessa.  
Avainsanat: Päätöksenteko, epävarmuuden sietäminen, riskinotto, sosiaaliset preferenssit, prospektiteoria, 
sosiaalinen paine, uhkapelaaminen, referenssiryhmä, referenssihenkilö 
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1. Introduction 
How does the salience or tangibility of social comparison affect an individual’s decisions in a 
decision making game containing risk? According to the traditional economic theory on decision 
making, an individual is most concerned with maximizing her monetary payoff in any given 
situation. This is mainly due to the fact that original utility functions contained only monetary 
payoffs as criteria. In actual situations, it is doubtful that decision making is so simple. Mainly 
because real life situations contain much more information, in addition to the financial facts, than 
laboratory experiments or standard theoretical models do. As economic theory has developed, 
more intricate theories have also been developed to explain decision making anomalies which 
seem to incorporate more factors into decision making process than simply personal financial or 
consumption considerations. The focus of this paper will be on how social comparison could affect 
behavior. Particularly, how perception of a reference person’s success and salience of this the 
social comparison affect risk taking. The hypothesis of this paper is that observed, comparable 
results from a reference group have an effect on risk taking of individuals – even if these results 
are formed completely independent of each other. Furthermore, controlling the salience (or 
tangibility) of the social comparison will have an effect on how large the effect of social 
comparison is on risk taking. Increased salience is hypothesized to amplify the effect of social 
comparison on risk taking. This paper will review the traditional expected utility theory, the more 
recent social preferences model and prospect theory, design a series of experiments to test the 
validity of the hypothesis and predict results based on the covered theories. Finally, implications of 
predicted results on the economic theories covered here are discussed. In addition to examining 
economic theories related to the questions at hand, psychological theory on how a reference 
group is selected, and how social pressure and emotions can have an impact on decision making 
under uncertainty are taken included in the considerations. 
A rational decision maker in a completely isolated setting, with no information on others, will 
sensibly not consider anything else than probabilities and payoffs of different outcomes. In other 
words, important considerations would only include the objectively observable information 
related to the problem. There would be no reason to consider anything else since there exists no 
interaction related to the decision and possible consequences. Usual settings where people 
actually make decisions are radically more complex. For people making decisions outside of an 
isolated setting, such as a laboratory, a more complex set of information is available and, 
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intuitively, would be considered when making an informed decision instead of being ignored. 
Information such as consequences of decisions, the emotional state of an individual when making 
a decision, and many other similar considerations would likely be taken into account.  
What other considerations could then alter preferences over several risky decisions in a more 
complex setting? First of all, people can have social preferences and they can care about the 
distribution of wealth. This means that to an individual, it would not only be important what her 
outcome is, but she would also care what the outcomes of others are. Social preferences models 
assume that people maximize their utility and that their utility functions are not purely self-
interested when they evaluate decisions. In decision making situation containing risky choices, the 
social preferences models belong to the domain of expected utility theory. People still maximize 
their expected utility; just the utility function includes considerations including other people as 
well. This concern for other’s outcomes could alter decision making in several ways depending on 
which formulation of the social preferences model is used. For example, higher outcomes for 
others could either yield increasing or decreasing utility for a decision maker. Different 
formulations and parameter versions of social preferences models, and their predictions, will be 
reviewed in depth in a chapter dedicated to the subject in theoretical review section.  
Compared to social preferences models, which are based on expected utility theory, prospect 
theory provides an alternative approach into evaluating risky prospects. Prospect theory relies on 
subjective perception of probabilities, and the relation of the outcome and a reference level in 
evaluating prospects. A reference level could be, for example, the starting amount of wealth in a 
gambling game or the one’s historical success in similar tasks. Valuations of an outcome in a 
hypothetical gambling game would depend on the difference between an actual outcome and 
one’s reference level. The evaluation of gambles is thus dependent on the amount of change they 
cause, instead of final wealth level. Interestingly enough, reference levels (also called reference 
points) in prospect theory are not limited to monetary considerations. People can evaluate their 
outcomes in the mentioned gambling situation also to other people playing the same game, their 
personal goals for outcomes and the subjective expectation of the end result. Similar to social 
preferences models, reference point formation in prospect theory can help incorporate more 
intricate evaluation considerations into decision making, in addition to purely monetary terms. 
Just like in the social preference models, outcomes for other people could affect the evaluation of 
an outcome by affecting reference point formation. Prospect theory will be reviewed more in 
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depth in the prospect theory portion of the theoretical review section. This section will also clarify 
prospect theory’s history and differences to expected utility theory.  
Outside of the traditional factors included in the economic decision making, two possible 
psychological considerations, which may influence decision making, are presented: social pressure 
and emotions. In addition to prospect theory and social preferences models, evidence is presented 
of the fact that social pressure has an effect on decision making. Experiments show social pressure 
causing subjects to exert higher effort levels and accept increased levels of risk. Most prominent 
experiments such as Milgram (1963) and Asch (1951) have experimental structures that exert 
social pressure explicitly on participants. Social pressure can also be more subtle and simply the 
presence of peers can influence how people behave. An especially relevant notion for this paper is 
that the effect of social pressure on behavior is moderated by the visibility of one’s peers.  
Predictions on the effects of social pressure are quite straightforward - opinions on how emotions 
affect risk taking is more mixed. Two competing theories on the effect of emotions on risk exist: 
mood-maintenance hypothesis and affect infusion model. According to mood-maintenance 
hypothesis (MMH) people in a positive mood wish to maintain their positive feeling by avoiding 
additional risk. Conversely, people in a negative mood do not wish to maintain their negative 
feeling and are willing to take on additional risk in order to alleviate the negativity. Competitor for 
the MMH is called the affect infusion model (AIM). AIM states that people in positive moods tend 
to accentuate the positive aspects of any situation, thus seeing the positive sides of a gamble more 
strongly which leads to increased willingness to take on additional risk. Negative moods in AIM 
lead to decreased willingness to increase risk taking for the same reasons. People in negative 
moods see the negative aspects of any gamble more strongly and are not willing to increase their 
level of risk. Additionally, negative feelings and emotions are suspected to affect behavior more 
strongly than positive moods. 
In addition to these main lines of theoretical review, history of economic decision making is 
reviewed in the form of expected utility theory and the concept of risk preferences will be 
explained. Since reference point formation and selection of a reference person is less explained in 
prospect theory, some psychological studies on the subjects will be presented as well. Finally, the 
hypothetical experiment along with expected results will be discussed.  
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1.1. Importance 
The goal of behavioral economic models is to better understand human behavior in various 
decision making situations. At the moment, decision making considerations are largely limited to 
evaluating different combinations of financial outcomes. In order to have stronger predictive 
capability, the effect of additional, non-financial factors should be explored. Better understanding 
how people conduct in decision making situations containing risk would have important 
implications; for example, in designing risk-control or incentive systems for employees in 
companies. Research could further develop theories such as social preferences model and 
prospect theory to better account for the effect of social comparison. This development would 
mean that models become more complex as they account for more factors. This tradeoff would be 
balanced by improved predictive accuracy. 
One practical example of how wage and effort are not always positively correlated is presented by 
Stark and Hyll (2011). Stark and Hyll describe how observable wage differences in a company lead 
to higher efforts from the lower earning workers. In addition to Stark and Hyll, there are several 
other papers exploring the effects of social comparison on decision making and behavior. However, 
the predictions of different models and results from various studies can vary widely. Reciprocity 
models are a good example. Reciprocity models, which will be further discussed under the review 
social preferences theory, would predict a worker will negatively reciprocate a low wage to her 
company. Reciprocity models’ prediction contradicts Stark and Hyll’s results. Regardless of the 
apparent discrepancies, it is undeniable that social comparison and performance of reference 
persons can have an effect on human decision making. Considering the lack of a unified approach, 
already simply collecting the different approaches on social comparison and risk preferences into 
one paper is valuable. 
Out of this varied field of models, this paper will pick the most relevant ones and present them in 
the theoretical review section. Focus will be on exploring how factors such as social comparison 
and emotions affect decision making, particularly in a decision situations containing risk. The 
approach is a departure from the mainstream approach into studying risk preferences. Economic 
studies commonly assume a person’s inherent risk preferences are defined by certain attributes 
(age, sex, education, etc.). A less studied field is how situational factors, such as the social 
comparison mentioned before, might affect risk preferences in addition to personal attributes. 
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When researching for this paper, it was difficult to find any meaningful articles discussing or 
studying how situational factors might affect risk preferences.  
However, situational factors might not be any less important. Consider for example the recent 
cases of rogue traders in banks such as UBS and Société Générale who caused losses of billions. It 
is hardly credible, that their risk taking behavior can be attributed simply to personal attributes 
such as age and gender. In the future it could be possible that risky situations are identified, 
instead of focusing on identifying risky employees. The predictive capability of prospect theory 
and social preferences model could be greatly improved if the potential impact of various levels of 
social comparison could be accounted for in the utility and valuation functions. For example in the 
social preferences model, assuming that the same parameters apply for all situations sounds 
simplified. Similarly in the prospect theory, assuming that perceived distance to reference point is 
mainly influenced by the status quo could potentially ignore important decision making influences. 
The final chapters discussing implications of potential results present suggestions on how different 
results could be modeled in both economic models. 
Social comparison and social pressure can already be linked to increased effort levels (even when 
financial incentives for increased performance are absent) in individuals. It would make sense that 
the same factors which increase motivation to raise one’s effort would also increase incentives to 
take on additional risk. Particularly, accepting additional levels of risk is the only method to 
improve one’s standing. Proving this fact empirically would provide additional evidence on how 
people can modify their behavior in response to explicit social comparison. In competitive settings, 
the results could aid in understanding possible effects of incentive systems more comprehensively. 
All in all, the effects of social comparison on risk taking have important implications - even though 
the subject has not been researched in depth in the field of economics. 
 
1.2. Research question 
How do risk preferences change in response to increasing salience of social comparison? 
According to most basic forms of expected utility theory, risk preferences would not change at all 
due to social comparison considerations. This stark form assumes that only personal outcomes 
meaningfully affect decision making of individuals. However, empirical experiments have provided 
ample evidence that people do consider a multitude of information when making decisions. 
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Consequently, decision making models such as social preferences model and prospect theory 
include payoffs for other people and consideration of other factors in addition to individual’s 
private wealth in their respective models. These models are important developments in efforts to 
build decision making models which more accurately model actual human behavior. 
What kind of a situation should the theoretical models reviewed in this paper predict? As 
mentioned before, social comparison is already proven to increase effort exerted by individuals. 
The relationship between effort and social comparison will be further discussed in the section 
reviewing social pressure research. It could be possible that different levels of salience for the 
social reference person and her results moderate effects of social comparison on risk aversion. It 
would make sense to hypothesize, that if social comparison has an effect on risk preferences, 
varying the tangibility of comparison and reference point from least explicit to most explicit would 
affect the intensity of this effect. The hypothesized effect is that participants experiencing 
disadvantageous social comparison will experience increased preference towards risk taking. 
Additionally, those participants who experience advantageous social comparison will have a 
decreased preference for risk. These results would mimic the effect social comparison can have on 
exerted work effort - but in the domain of risk preferences. Lastly, emotional effects lead to a 
possibility that the effect of advantageous comparison is more subtle.  
A large part of this paper is dedicated to reviewing the important developments in economic 
decision making theory and the psychological effects which may alter decision making. 
Psychological research on behavior will complement economic theory and help in predicting the 
effects of emotions and social pressure on behavior. Finally, theoretical predictions and a 
hypothetical experiment are present in the end. 
 
1.3. Expected results 
Reviewed theories predict that people observing advantageous social comparison will exhibit 
lower preference for risk. Additionally, advantageous comparison is expected to affect people less 
than observing disadvantageous comparison. People observing disadvantageous comparison, on 
the other hand, are expected to be more willing to accept higher levels of risk. Both of these 
effects are expected to be moderated by the salience of social comparison. Increasing salience 
should lead to larger effect of social comparison on risk taking and vice versa. Higher willingness to 
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take risk is explained by higher marginal utility in social comparison theory and through 
differences on perceived position in relation to the reference point in prospect theory. It should be 
noted that the support from social preferences model is dependent on the parameter selection, 
which will be discussed more in depth in the social preferences section.  
How could the changing tangibility or salience, and resulting changes in risk preferences, be 
modeled in social preferences theory and prospect theory? Parameters of social preferences 
model could be affected by changing salience and further change the marginal utility experienced 
by people. For prospect theory, changing the tangibility of social comparison could affect how long 
a distance to the reference point is perceived to be. Both possibilities will be discussed more in 
depth in chapter 5. 
These expected results are also supported by evidence from social pressure research in psychology. 
Psychological research has shown that the mere presence of a better performing peer can lead to 
increased effort and risk taking by individuals. Evidence from research on emotions is much more 
diverse, however. There is no universal agreement on the effect emotions can have on risk taking; 
two competing hypothesis predict contrary effects for positive and negative moods. Also, impact 
of emotions is dependent on which feelings are evoked in each person and how strongly these 
feelings are experienced. Different moods and their strength are almost impossible to predict and 
thus reaching a conclusion on the end effect cannot be completely accurate. Regardless of the lack 
of a unified approach, empirical research by Seo, Goldfarb and Barrett (2010) provide some hints 
on how emotions might affect risk taking. In this study, pleasant moods lead to increased risk 
taking in the domain of gains and increased risk aversion in the domain of losses. Furthermore, 
negative or unpleasant moods also lead to increased risk aversion in the domain of losses but had 
no implications in the domain of gains. This study suggests that research on emotions does not 
support the predictions of economic models. Or at least mood states moderate the effects 
predicted by social preferences models and prospect theory. 
In order to further understand effects of emotions in the particular setting of this paper, effects of 
emotions are measured by a questionnaire to be completed along with the decision task 
containing risk. Even though research on emotions provides predictions potentially contradicting 
economic models, emotions are not expected to have such a dominating effect, that they would 
reverse the predictions of presented previously. Expected results, and implications of different 
combinations of possible outcomes, with various mood states, are examined in depth in chapter 5.  
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2. Theoretical background 
This chapter will begin with a discussion on the importance of reference group comparison and 
rules which govern the selection of a reference group or a reference person. Economic theory will 
follow, beginning with the concept of risk preferences and traditional view on valuing decision 
making under risk: the expected utility theory. In conjunction with the expected utility model, 
social preferences function offers a specific type of a utility function which accounts for more than 
simply individual payoffs. The focus then moves to an alternative to the expected utility theory 
called the prospect theory. After reviewing these economic models, psychological research on the 
effects of emotions and social pressure on decision making are explored. Sections outlined above 
will act as a foundation on which the research question and theoretical predictions of 
experimental outcomes are based on. Next, notations common to several sections of this paper 
are introduced.  
 
2.1. Preferences Notations and Definitions 
Preference notations are made as follows throughout the paper. Preference notations signify the 
preference order of an individual over several potential choices. For example, a person could 
prefer cereals over porridge at breakfast. Weak preference of one option over the other: , for 
example preference of   over         and vice versa      . A strict preference is denoted 
using , for example, strict preference of   over         and vice versa      . Indifference 
or no preference between options: , for example an individual is indifferent between   and   
     .  
A gamble (can also be called a prospect) will be denoted as below. Where an example gamble X 
consists of two payoffs (   ,   ) and the respective probabilities for those payoffs (α, β).  
             
Probabilities for each outcome will always be symbolized by lowercase Greek alphabet but will 
also be mentioned separately. All of the probabilities will lie in the interval      . 
Expected value of a gamble is a weighted average of outcomes. The weighs used are the 
respective probabilities of each outcome. Expected value should not be confused with expected 
utility. As the section on expected utility theory clarifies, people’s departures from objective 
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mathematical valuations originally inspired Bernoulli to study how personal utility functions 
influence the valuation of a gamble.  
 
2.2. Reference group selection and importance of comparison 
Reference person, or group, defines an individual, or a group of individuals, who are used as a 
point of reference when evaluating own outcomes and success. Comparison outcome has basically 
the same meaning, it defines the outcome level relative to which own outcomes are evaluated. 
Comparable success on the other hand could encompass anything from placement at a sports 
event to political opinions. Due to the nature of this paper, focus later on will be mainly on 
monetary measurement of success. This section includes a review on what constitutes as a 
reference person in psychology. This will be relevant in following sections dealing with social 
preferences theory and, particularly, prospect theory. 
In the realm of social psychology, Festinger (1954) originally outlined a theory of social comparison 
process. According to Festinger’s theory, people have a constant need to evaluate their current 
state and their own abilities. More specifically related to the current state, people evaluate how 
relevant their opinion of their own current state is. These evaluations of opinion and ability would 
ideally be based on some objective criteria. If an objective measure is not readily available, 
opinions and abilities are evaluated by observing, and comparing to, the opinions and abilities of 
others. These observations of other people act as feedback for the observer, and provide a 
replacement of an objective measurement scale thus helping the observers in their comparison 
process. Naturally, comparison to just anyone will not be relevant. Most readily a good reference 
person could be identified by observing performance of others and selecting reference persons 
with similar performance levels. Conversely, as the observable performance levels diverge, 
relevance of the comparison decreases. One could think of high-school students playing football. 
They probably dream of reaching the abilities of a famous football star, but realistically evaluate 
their own development to other students who more accurately resemble their own skill level. This 
way of evaluation also gives more measurable feedback as it is easier to recognize development. 
This is because development relative to one’s school friends can be observed more easily then 
development relative to a superstar of football.  
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Unfortunately, evaluation of abilities to individuals with similar performance levels proved to be 
more problematic than Festinger expected as Martin et al. (2002) note in their review of prior 
research. Firstly, people in experiments were not interested in individuals who performed similarly 
to themselves but rather, in individuals who did extremely well. This would hint that the presence 
of a high performer leads to people ignoring more reasonable reference persons. Other problem is 
that even though performance was comparable at a task, this doesn’t tell anything of how good or 
bad people should feel about their performance. A few observations of performance do not reveal 
enough of the underlying attributes of people. Proposition of the reference point is later clarified 
in psychology by theories which state that people choose to compare themselves to others who 
have similar characteristics and attributes, rather than just evaluating own abilities to individuals 
with similar results (Martin et al. 2002). This method of evaluating results gives people a more 
accurate picture of whether she is filling her potential and basing the comparison to a meaningful 
reference point. 
Finally, observed differences between reference person and oneself motivate people to take 
action in order to reduce those differences. Additionally, there is assumed to be a drive in people 
to constantly develop their own abilities. So a reduction in an observed difference in abilities 
would not commonly be corrected by reducing one’s own ability level. On the other hand, if a 
reference group’s abilities are observed to be superior, the observer would devote to developing 
her abilities more and take necessary action to reduce difference. It is worth noting that Festinger 
does not define which would be more prominent, the desire to develop own abilities or bring the 
reference group more closer to own abilities. The latter could happen in several ways, such as a 
person changing her reference person or attempting to alter the actual ability levels of others. 
Motivation to take action is not the only possible result of reference group comparison but the 
comparison process can have wider implications. Suls et al. (2002) states that relative position to a 
reference point influence an individual’s aspiration level, self-concept and subjective well-being. 
As the section on the effect of emotions on behavior will clarify, defining the types of emotions 
and moods evoked by the comparison process would be important in predicting behavior. 
Unfortunately, psychological research has no simple answer on whether downward comparison 
(comparing to someone worse off) elicits positive feelings or whether positive comparison elicits 
negative feelings – both could be interpreted in several ways. Downward comparison could mean 
that one is well off or remind an individual that things can get worse. The same applies for positive 
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comparison. Instead of focusing on the emotions evoked by different reference comparisons, this 
section will further focus on what mechanisms notify a person of failure or success. In the end of 
this section it will be clear that reference persons can affect individual perception of success. 
Reference point comparison has a role in self-evaluation and an effect on human behavior but 
what defines the significance and magnitude of social comparison’s effect. One could think of 
social comparison as an additional source of feedback on behavior, especially when one perceives 
a failure in relation to a reference person. The rest of this section clarifies how psychological 
research understands the detection of errors in behavior. As mentioned before, this section will 
conclude on how reference point performance in relation to oneself can affect the perception of 
the size of an error. 
Humans are capable of detecting errors in their behavior and correcting their behavior in order to 
improve performance. In psychological research, it is assumed that the cost of errors has led to 
development of evolutionary mechanisms which detect, correct and compensate errors, and that 
there are neural processes which guide this error detection. Observations of such possible 
processes were already present in research by Rabbitt (1966). In Rabbitt’s research, response 
times in a choice-response experiment were longer for choices following a wrong response than 
for other choice scenarios. Participants detected their error that had occurred in the previous 
choice and took more time when responding to the following choice. Levelt (1989) mentions a 
similar pause for consideration in human speech when an error is detected: when speakers 
recognize errors in their speech, they take a pause to construct a correction to the detected error. 
The errors can be detected either through self-monitoring or through feedback received. The 
system that could be imagined to control action and information processing is described by Logan 
(1985). Logan’s research review outlines a system which controls and coordinates the choice of 
strategies made by individuals, processes information and makes changes to strategies if the goals 
and the environment change. In addition to these functions, the executive system processes 
information – regarding errors, for example - upon which chosen strategies are based. In other 
words, the success in a chosen strategy is constantly reviewed according to set criteria and revised 
if necessary. 
Early research into error detection was driven by observations of behavior. Later on, a more in-
depth view on brain activity became the goal. In order to research responses to errors, Gehring et 
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al. (1990) measured brain responses to errors in reaction time experiments. Errors made by 
participants were accompanied by a detection of electrical brain activity called error-related 
negativity (ERN) on the scalp of the participants. Correct answers in reaction time experiments did 
not lead to detection of the ERN. Gehring et al. (1993) relate the ERN response to a system which 
monitors performance and compensates for errors performed by individuals. In other words, they 
provide evidence that a performance-monitoring and error-compensating system exists and that 
ERN is related to that system by signaling committed errors. The functioning of this system was 
further investigated by Bernstein et al. (1995) who found that the ERN involves a comparison 
between the response that actually occurred and a correct response. Moreover, size of the error 
signal detected in participants was dependent on how similar the two responses being compared 
were; a greater similarity resulted in a smaller error signal. Clearly, a larger error results in a larger 
error signal and a smaller error results in a smaller error signal. As will be described later on, 
success of others in a similar task can also affect the size of the error signal and not only one’s own 
success. This is evidence of the fact that social comparison provides an important and natural way 
of evaluating success and detecting areas of improvement. 
Is the ERN related to whether the error can be corrected immediately? According to Scheffers et al. 
(1996) it is not. ERN signals manifested similarly both in situations where the error could be 
corrected immediately and where it could not be undone. Furthermore, size of the error signal did 
not differentiate between the two choices. Finding no difference between the two, the result 
implicates that the ERN is more closely connected to a system of error detection than immediate 
error correction. In their research, Miltner et al. (1997) state that the ERN is not dependent on a 
specific type of error but the signal is detected in errors of choice, estimation and action. This 
leads to the conclusion that ERN is related to generic error detection mechanism that is not 
dependent on identifying particular errors in any specific type of activity. 
Mars et al. (2004) state that the feedback ERN detects errors and that even incorrect feedback can 
affect the behavior of participants in time estimation experiments. In their experiment, 
participants corrected their behavior according to received feedback and the size of the correction 
was related to the size of error reported in the feedback. Clearly, performance feedback given by 
others affects behavior of people. What about the mere presence of people and the observation 
of their actions and outcomes?  
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People could also use the success of their social reference persons as feedback, even if these 
reference persons are not factually giving any explicit feedback. But does observing the success of 
other people affect the error signal elicited like other feedback? Boksem et al. (2010) observe the 
size of error-signals in a two-player time estimation game. In this game both players could see 
both results but rewards were only dependent on independent performance of participants. In 
other words, it was not possible for participant A’s reward to be affected by participant B’s actions 
in any way. First of all, Boksem at al. confirm that incorrect answers in a time-estimation task 
cause a larger error-signal than a correct answer. Error-signal caused by an incorrect answer is 
further amplified if another player simultaneously succeeds in the same task. It seems that failure 
seems much worse when a reference person is perceived as successful. This also means that 
people allow other individuals to influence evaluations of their success without recognizing the 
effect themselves. 
This section has outlined the current conclusion of psychological research that people need to 
evaluate themselves and that other people are used in this process of evaluation. The reference 
person should be comparable to the individual performing the comparison. Observed differences 
in comparison to the reference person will lead to higher motivation and can subjective well-being, 
among other things. Unfortunately, the effect of various social comparisons on emotions, and 
subsequently the effect of emotions on behavior, is unclear. Luckily, research on the error 
detection systems evidences provides information on how people perceive success and how 
reference persons can amplify the significance of perceived errors. Finally, the perceived errors 
and feedback from others clearly does have an effect on observed behavior. The following 
sections will introduce economic concepts of risk preferences and continue with prospect theory 
and social preferences model.  
 
2.3. Risk preferences 
The effects of personal attributes and how they affect risk aversion in individuals has been widely 
researched in economics. This research is useful, for example, for companies which need to 
construct risk profiles according to the limited information available. One useful application could 
be the screening of certain personality attributes in recruitment situations or the pricing of an 
insurance policy. In economic theory, and more specifically in expected utility theory, risk 
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preference levels are divided into three main types: preference towards certainty, risk neutrality 
and preference towards risk. Risk preferring individuals receive more utility from a gamble than 
they would from a monetary amount equal to the gamble’s expected value. Certainty preferring 
individuals, on the other hand, receive less utility from a gamble than they would from receiving 
the expected monetary value of the gamble. Risk neutral individuals would be indifferent between 
the two. Graphs of the risk types and their respective, traditional utility function types will be 
presented in the next section. 
Previous research states that an individual’s risk type is defined by the combination of personal 
attributes they possess. For example, Guiso and Paiella (2008) propose that increasing wealth 
decreases risk aversion. In another paper, Dohmen et al. (2011) investigate how age, background, 
gender and even height can affect individual’s willingness to take risks. These and a multitude of 
other studies agree on the fact that individual attributes do affect risk taking. However, these 
studies have not attempted to explain how different situations might affect underlying risk 
preferences. Thus there is an implicit assumption that preferred level of risk aversion remains 
constant over different situations or at least, that the personal risk preference is dominant in 
determining even the situational risk preference levels. A more realistic assumption would be that 
different individuals have varying baselines of risk aversion, the level of which is determined by 
personal attributes. This baseline level is then modified by situational factors such as how one 
perceives herself in social comparison situations. 
Some basic individual attributes will be measured in the beginning of a decision making game of 
the experiment that follows later. This will allow for simple comparison between different groups 
and help ensure that participants in these groups are broadly similar in their attributes. The 
theories presented here will gather evidence on how social comparison can affect risk taking and 
thus help gather evidence on effects of situational factors on risk taking. 
 
2.4. Expected utility 
Expected utility theory provides a good foundation on decision making under risk and helps 
understand how decision theory has developed throughout the history of economic theory. 
Expected utility theory states that people consider the utility of each possible gamble and choose 
a gamble that maximizes their expected utility. Expected utility differs from expected value and 
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could be both higher, lower or equal to the mathematical expectation of the value. This chapter 
will review the most important developments in expected utility theory and explain how the 
theory is used. 
Bernoulli (1738) was the first to consider that people’s valuation of gambles was different from 
the expected monetary values that could be assigned to a gamble mathematically. In practice, this 
means that a gamble providing either 10 or 0 euros with equal opportunity could be valued at 
below or above the expected value of 5 euros, depending on who is asked. This personal valuation 
could, for example, depend on the wealth status of the individual. Bernoulli gives an example 
where a poor man would be more inclined to sell a gamble below its expected value than a rich 
man would. Thus, the value of a gamble is not dependent on the expected payoff but on the 
person making the estimate and the utility it yields to this person. It seems sensible to examine 
the probability weighed utility of each payoff for a gamble, or expected utility, when attempting to 
understand decision making under risk. Probability weighing of utilities for various outcomes is the 
basic idea of evaluating uncertain outcomes used in expected utility theory. 
Even though the basic idea was already presented in 1738, expected utility theory (EUT) only 
began to gain prominence after Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) articulated three simple 
axioms of preference defining a rational decision maker. Later on, Samuelson (1952) and 
Malinvaud (1952) articulated the fourth axiom of independence which was only implied by 
Neumann and Morgenstern. If the four axioms are satisfied, an individual’s preferences can be 
presented by a utility function. The four axioms are completeness, transitivity, independence and 
continuity. Alternatives to the original axioms have been developed after 1947 but the original 
four will be described here. The original axioms are most widely used and they will also be most 
relevant when reviewing prospect theory and criticism towards the expected utility theory.  
The first axiom is called completeness. Completeness means that an individual has preferences. 
That is, she prefers one option over the other or is indifferent. When completeness applies, an 
individual can decide between alternatives presented to her by using the underlying preferences. 
The axiom of transitivity means that individuals are consistent with their preferences. For example, 
if an individual has three gambles to choose from:  ,   and  . This individual has preferences and 
if   is preferred over   and   is preferred over  , then   is (strictly) preferred over  . 
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Independence axiom defines that if a person has preferences over two gambles, she maintains her 
order of preference when both of the options are manipulated similarly. Consider again three 
gambles  ,  ,   and additionally        . 
                                
Finally, continuity axiom states preferences are continuous. This means that several gambles of 
different preferences can be combined to attain gambles, preferences of which are not necessarily 
identical to any of the single gambles. Consider again three gambles  ,   and  . 
                                                           
For all of the axioms presented here, it is naturally assumed that utilities for different alternatives 
or gambles correspond to the preferences. For example, if gamble   is preferred over gamble   
the utility of gamble   is also greater than gamble  . 
Friedman and Savage (1948) defend the principles of EUT in their article after it had been thus far 
discarded by economists - with the exception of Neumann and Morgenstern. Neglect of the EUT 
was caused by a belief that the theory could not explain decision making under risk mainly due to 
the assumption of diminishing marginal utility (Friedmand and Savage 1948). Diminishing marginal 
utility means that having more wealth, people assign smaller amounts of utility to an additional 
dollar than those with less wealth. Assumption of diminishing marginal utility would assume that 
all individuals have risk adverse preferences and this made it difficult to explain gambling through 
expected utility maximization. Neglect of EUT until Neumann and Morgenstern presented their 
axioms has also been explained with Bernoulli’s use of cardinal utility scale instead of ordinal 
utility (Starmer 2000). What shape does an individual’s utility function have if diminishing marginal 
utility does not apply in all cases? Friedman and Savage (1948) disregard the assumption of 
diminishing marginal utility for all. Instead, they state that individuals may have different types of 
utility functions which determine their valuation of uncertain prospects. Similar to maximizing 
utility under certainty, in EUT individuals attempt to maximize the expected utility they assign to 
various uncertain outcomes. Shape of the utility function reflects different risk preferences people 
can have. These are the three types of preferences mentioned in the previous section: preference 
towards risk, risk neutrality and preference of certainty. Below are depictions of the utility 
functions associated with preferences for certainty and risk. A risk neutral utility function is linear 
which leads to the certainty equivalent always equaling the gamble’s expected value. 
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Graph 1: Utility function of a certainty preferring individual. This graph depicts a utility function 
which is concave, leading to a situation where the expected utility from a gamble    , containing 
two possible payoffs (   and   ), is always smaller than the utility of the expected value of the 
gamble. In other words, the value a person would be willing to pay for the gamble (   ) is always 
smaller than the mathematically expected outcome from this gamble (  ).  
Graph 2: Utility function of a risk preferring individual. The second utility function belongs to a 
risk preferring individual and is convex. Convexity causes every gamble to have a higher expected 
utility    , than would be the utility of the expected value (  ) of the two possible outcomes (   
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and   ). This leads to risk preferring individuals being willing to pay more for a gamble than would 
be the objective expected value (      ). 
Imagine a person has two possible payoffs in a gamble called  ,    and     and that       
applies.    and     have probabilities   and  , respectively, of occurring and           .  
Individual risk preferences are determined by how the following functions relate to each 
other:      and                   . That is, how the utility of expected payoff and the 
gamble’s expected utility relate to each other. 
If           applies, the individual has a preference towards certainty. This means that a 
person would receive less utility from taking the gamble than the expected payoff would imply in 
simply monetary terms. If           applies, the individual has a preference towards risk. 
This is a reverse of the first case, now a person actually receives more utility from taking the 
gamble than the utility of expected payoff would suggest. And in the final case where      
    , there is no specific preference towards risk or certainty. As it is assumed that all three 
different shapes for the utility function can be observed in people, the assumption of diminishing 
marginal utility for all individuals can be discarded. Shapes of the utility functions help understand 
Bernoulli’s original observation and explain why people can assign gambles values that are 
different from their expected values.  
Concept of certainty equivalent can further help clarify different risk preferences. A certainty 
equivalent is a payoff     which satisfies            for all types of risk preference. Following 
cases apply for the different classes of preferences and their relation to certainty equivalent. 
         For certainty preference 
        For risk preference 
       For risk neutrality 
This leads to a case where risk preferring individuals are only willing to exchange their gamble to a 
sum of money greater than the expected monetary outcome of a gamble is. Conversely, certainty 
preferring people are willing to accept less money if they can avoid taking a gamble which contains 
risk. Whatever shape an individual’s utility function has in the end, course of the EUT is very 
straightforward. If people have rational preferences, the order of which is known over a finite set 
of gambles, it is possible to describe how they will decide when presented with a choice of 
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gambles from this set. Friedman and Savage (1948) also proposed that an individual’s utility 
function would be concave for low amounts of wealth, change to convex between certain wealth 
levels and again continue as concave as the level of wealth surpasses a certain threshold. However, 
this proposition has been less popular in economics. 
Empirical experiments conducted to test EUT discovered several inconsistencies with its 
predictions. The first of which was the Allais paradox (Allais 1953) which showed that in some 
cases the preference of an individual over two gambles could be reversed by modifying both 
gambles identically. The results violate the independence axiom which was explained previously. 
The purpose of this paper will not be to review all of the subsequent developments in the EUT 
which attempt to solve the Allais paradox and problems related to the independence axiom. This 
decision is supported by the fact that there is no conclusive evidence to support any single line of 
generalized expected utility theory. See Harless and Camerer (1994) for a more in-depth 
discussion. Most common problems with EUT, which lead to the development of prospect theory, 
will be presented in the prospect theory section. 
How would different levels risk aversion be measured in EUT? Arrow-Pratt measure of risk 
aversion, developed simultaneously by Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1965) provides an answer. Below 
is a formulation of the measure as presented by Pratt (1964, pp. 122), where      is the risk 
aversion measure,       is the first derivative of a utility function and        is the second 
derivative. 
     
       
     
 
A positive measure would indicate risk aversion and a negative figure represents risk seeking. A 
higher curvature of a concave (convex) utility function in would indicate higher levels of risk 
aversion (seeking). In his paper, Pratt mentions that risk aversion is affected by two variables: the 
wealth of the individual and the level of risk. For example, for a concave utility function, the risk 
aversion is a decreasing function of wealth and an increasing function of risk. This is intuitive, as 
the level of wealth increases individual’s tolerance for a defined gamble, which remains 
unchanged, also increases. Again, the idea behind risk aversion (seeking) is the concave (convex) 
shape of the utility function. It is difficult to formulate a utility function in empirical settings so the 
experiments presented in the empirical section will use a more convenient measure of risk 
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aversion. In the experiment participants are given a certain amount of money and they have to 
decide how much of it to place as a stake in a gamble where the money either is doubled or lost 
with equal opportunity. The higher the staked amount, higher the implied risk taking of an 
individual. 
Arrow (1971) further shows that individuals are risk neutral in gambles using arbitrarily small 
stakes. This as well makes intuitive sense, since outcomes are small enough to virtually not change 
the individual’s wealth, risk does not enter decision making as an important consideration. Stakes 
in the proposed hypothetical experiment later on will not be arbitrarily small as defined by Arrow 
and should thus yield meaningful results. 
Apart from small stake gambles, some economists such as Mathew Rabin state that a problem still 
exists with expected utility. For certainty preferring behavior, concave utility function implies a 
diminishing marginal utility as wealth increases and this can lead to problems as mentioned earlier 
(Rabin 2000). The problem arises as it is possible to find equal probability gambles with a modest 
possible loss and infinitely increasing possible gain, which an individual would not accept. This 
problem arises in modest or large stake gambles and is thus not that important for the goal of this 
paper, as the potential empirical research is focused on small stake gambles. 
Despite criticism, expected utility theory is very useful in understanding the idea of decision 
making under risk and can be used to understand how changes in utility affect decision making. 
The social preferences model presented in the next chapter is an expected utility maximization 
model where the utility function accounts for other variables in addition to wealth. Prospect 
theory, on the other hand was created as an alternative model to EUT and will be discussed as well.  
 
2.5. Social preferences -model 
Let’s assume that a person makes decisions according to one criterion: attempting to maximize 
her monetary payoff. This person is then given the task of dividing 10 dollars between her and 
another person, called the “accepter.” The accepter always has to accept the division proposed. 
What proposed division would now make sense, considering our decider’s motives? A good 
prediction would be the decider keeps the full 10 dollars to her and the accepter would just have 
to live with the situation. This would be the case if one is to assume that the decider’s utility 
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function is only dependent on the monetary amount received and strictly increases as the payoff 
increases. Experiments with actual people making the same decision show that this prediction is 
overly simplified. Below is an example graph of actual results, with real payoffs, of offer sizes from 
Forsythe et al. (1994, p. 366). Horizontal axis as the amount of money offered to the accepter and 
the vertical axis indicates how many observations of this offer there were. Total amount of 
observations in this particular experiment was 24. 
 
Graph 3: Amount of dollars offered to the accepter in a 10-dollar dictator game (Forsythe et al. 
1994) 
It is worth noting that the results presented above are taken from a game with real money stakes. 
Also, the decider’s proposed division is always enforced. There is no apparent reason for the 
decider to offer the accepter anything above 0. As people are clearly offering more than would be 
predicted, there must be some other motives at play and affecting their decisions. Most people 
would not consider a division where the proposer takes the full 10 dollars fair. Thus it is important 
to find a model, which includes more factors to the utility function than simply monetary 
incentives, if these anomalies are to be explained. In this chapter, considerations for other people, 
how they can affect decision making and how the concept of fairness fits into social preferences 
are explored. First, the backgrounds of three social preferences models will be reviewed and then 
a composite model combining all three will be presented. The three branches of social preferences 
models discussed here are reciprocity, difference aversion and social-welfare maximization models.  
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As early as 1925, Alfred Marshall noted the use of term ”fairness” by both employers and 
employees (Marshall 1925). Even if he noted that the term is difficult to grasp from an economists 
point of view, he also states that it must have some real meaning at a workplace. So how could an 
individual’s view on fairness change the way she behaves?  
Mayo (1949) had a more clear vision on the matter, as he states that a social group is very 
influential in determining the functioning of company. In Mayo’s opinion, social groups influence 
behavior by varying how motivated the workers are, how often they are absent from the 
workplace and how productive they are. Mayo’s perception on the effect of social groups was 
based on his own observations. Could it be that that people would also care about how they view 
fairness towards their social group in addition to considering themselves? Effects of social groups 
on workplace behavior were recorded and presented in figures a little later by George Homans 
(Homans 1954). Homans noted productivity levels exceeding company requirements in very 
simple tasks, regardless of the fact that none of the employees either wanted a promotion or 
believed in there being a possibility for one. Aside from career advancement, there must be other 
forces driving such behavior. 
The concept of fairness is an intuitive way of describing social preferences that may affect 
behavior. Social considerations could have at least three types of influence on preferences - as 
presented in Charness and Rabin (2002). Firstly, there’s reciprocity. It is perceived as fair that 
people, who one is kind to, are also kind towards that individual. Secondly, individuals can have a 
preference towards difference aversion. For example, people would perceive decreasing wealth 
differences between individuals as fair. The methods by which differences are reduced are not so 
important and even decreasing overall wealth of the group could be acceptable if differences were 
reduced. Thirdly, people could have a preference towards maximizing the social welfare of a group. 
That is, differences in outcomes for different members are not important as in the preference for 
difference aversion. It is more important to maximize the social group’s outcome as a whole.  
These social preferences affect employee behavior in Homans’ paper according to Akerlof (1982). 
Workers in Homan’s paper form a social group and this group had formed a norm on how much 
would be a suitable level of productivity - which was in excess of the company’s requirement. The 
level of productivity in excess of the company requirement can be understood as a gift by the 
employees to the company. In return for the group’s collective productivity effort, they expect the 
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company to reciprocate their gift. This could for example be a higher average wage for the group 
as a whole or leniency towards the weakest workers of the group, which would point to difference 
aversion. The company’s response then again affects the worker’s norm formation. As the group 
forms its own norm of a suitable level of productivity it can be seen as maximizing the social 
welfare of the group. Workers anticipate the company to reciprocate their effort and thus increase 
welfare of the group. (Akerlof 1982) 
Homans’ paper provides a good example on how social preferences can influence behavior in an 
environment where money has traditionally been the main motivational driver in economic 
analysis. Now, reciprocity, difference aversion and social welfare maximization are explored 
separately. These relate to how fair interaction between people is judged and how fair it is to 
advance the two mentioned social goals (income equality and social welfare maximization). 
 
2.5.1. Reciprocity 
It is intuitively sensible that people would like to punish those treating them badly and reward 
those who have behaved towards them in a positive way. Wage setting as a gift giving game 
between a group of workers and their employer, presented earlier, depends on this intuition. 
Workers in this game expect a reward for their gift of higher productivity to the company. If the 
employer was to not return the favor to the workers, they could feel unfairly treated and punish 
the company by lowering their productivity. Akerlof (1982) mentions, that employer’s behaviour in 
Homans’ paper had already led to problems with reciprocity before. It could be that the employer 
at some point did not reciprocate the employee effort, which led to conflicts in the company. 
In this example the different parties were giving and expecting gifts from each other. But what if 
there was no such expectation. In Akerlof (1982), one could say that the employer improves the 
worker’s conditions in order to avoid their punishment. Would the employer still reciprocate if 
there was absolutely no risk of reprisal?  
In the 1980’s economists started developing formal models to describe social preferences and 
their influence on behavior. Sudgen’s (1984) model was among the first in which individuals 
donate an effort to provide public goods for all. In this model, people donate effort to provide 
public goods for all. A person receives utility from the public good, but she is also obliged to 
donate some level of effort towards the production of the public good. The utility function is 
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defined as below, where    is a utility function for person  ,    is the effort level she donates to the 
production of the public good and   is the amount of public good available. Her utility is an 
increasing function of   and decreasing of   .  
            
In Sudgen’s model, the amount of the donation is defined by the social group an individual belongs 
to. The amount a person donates is determined by two things: (1) the level of desirable 
contribution this person thinks everyone should give in a group and (2) the amount donated by 
other people in the group. As in Sudgen (1984), consider that    is the level of optimal donation by 
her social group in  's view. Also,    is defined as a contribution of any other member of that same 
social group. Now individual  's contribution    is in her view sufficient if either of the following 
criteria is fulfilled. 
             
As it is possible to see here, Sudgen’s model only set’s minimums to donations people feel obliged 
to give. The model is still somewhat simpler than what one would consider reciprocity to contain. 
For example, punishing those who are unfair towards a person is not considered. The case 
presented by Sudgen applies to a case where a group is together producing something and 
enjoying the product together. Negative consequences for unfair behavior are still missing from 
this model. It does however present a model where an individual is not purely motivated by simple 
self-interest. 
Reciprocity as a concept is more complex than simply accounting for how much individuals are 
willing to contribute towards a common goal. According to bargaining experiments, people assign 
some value to punishing those who give unfair offers. This is evidenced by the fact that 
experiments have found people turning down positive payoffs in bargaining games if this also 
punishes an unfair party.  
Thaler (1988) describes several such instances of experiments utilizing the ultimatum game. In an 
ultimatum game, one of two players decides how to divide a set amount of money and the other 
decides whether to accept this division. When accepted, the division is executed as suggested but 
if turned down, neither player gets anything. As mentioned by Thaler, the traditional solution only 
considers the financial payoffs for each player and would suggest an outcome where the smallest 
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positive amount of money is offered to the other player and she accepts it. Observed outcomes 
are quite different with players turning down even sizeable offers in order to punish others for 
perceived unfair division. That is, people are willing to sacrifice their own financial payoffs in order 
to punish parties they feel are behaving unfairly. 
A model which accounted for more interaction than Sudgen’s formulation, in a game of two 
players, was later developed by Rabin. Rabin (1993) presents three rules, according to which 
reciprocity drives individual preferences. Firstly, people wish to reward those who are kind to 
them and are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being to do so. Secondly, people prefer to 
punish those who behave unfairly towards them and are again willing to sacrifice their material 
well-being to do so. Thirdly, two first motivations affect behavior more when the cost of sacrifice 
is smaller. Fairness in Rabin’s model is basically defined as how equally payoffs are divided in a 
game and in this respect relates to how fairness is understood in Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) 
difference aversion model described later on.  
Rabin examines a normal form game theoretic situation and incorporates beliefs into his model in 
addition to simply considering the game’s explicit payoffs. More specifically: beliefs of the 
intentions of other players’ are included. Player   decides how to treat player  , and bases this 
decision on her belief of how player   will in turn treat player  . Player   goes through the same 
consideration process. Below is a utility function presented for player   in a two player game 
consisting of players   and  . In this function    is player     material payoff,   ̅ is the level of 
kindness player   expects from player   and   is the level of kindness exhibited towards player   
by player  . It is worth noting that Rabin considered normal form games where players chose 
simultaneously and so the belief of the other’s behavior is important instead of actual observed 
behavior. A rational assumption would be that an individual’s belief of the fairness of others is 
affected by their past behavior as well. 
        ̅       
The kindness functions can have values ranging from   to 
 
 
. Equitable payoff is defined as a 
value of   for either of the two fairness functions. Additionally, positive values exhibit higher 
kindness and negative values unkind behavior. Kindness function is an increasing function of how 
much payoff is given to the other player and vice versa. How fairly player   actually behaves 
towards player   depends on the expectation of player     fairness towards player  .  If   ̅   , 
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then player   has an incentive to lower    in order to increase utility. In the examples presented 
by Rabin lowering    also lowers   . Because the decision to punish also affects player     
material payoff, punishing player    should provide an offsetting increase in utility to be 
reasonable. The smaller the loss in material payoff is the more reciprocal behavior will be 
exhibited by the players. 
If in the above function   ̅   , then player A prefers to increase   . Player   would prefer to be 
fairer to player  , if she expects player   to be fair to her. This is of course contingent on the fact 
that increases in    are not offset by changes in   . It’s possible for    to decrease but the total 
utility should still be higher as a result of the increase in   . This exemplifies sacrificing monetary 
payoffs in order to increase the level of fairness towards another player. It is worth noting that 
Rabin only considered single-stage games of complete information in his model due to the fact 
that fairness easily incorporated into normal form game theoretic situations. Regardless of this 
shortfall, the presented model explains general principles of reciprocity clearly. 
Returning to Homans’ recording of employee behavior, Rabin’s formulation of reciprocal behavior 
would explain the worker’s and employer’s behavior. This model would also predict that the 
employer rewards the efforts of the employees and that this rewarding is not necessarily 
motivated by the fear of reprisal. The prime motivation would instead come from the 
reciprocating fairness of the employees. From the employees’ side, Akerlof and Yellen (1990) 
conclude that employee efforts depend on the relationship of fair and actual wage. Employees 
hold a conception of a fair wage level, which they compare to their observed actual wage and 
finally reciprocate their wage level to the company by deciding an effort level dependent on the 
observed relationship. In other words, employees observe how fairly they are treated and decide 
how well the employer should be treated in response. 
Dufwenberg and Kichsteiger (2004) expand Rabin’s theory to sequential games. However, the 
main purpose of this review is to expand on the notion of fairness in the social preferences model 
and thus an expanded review of reciprocity will not be relevant. An important notion for 
reciprocity is the intention behind an action – people care whether the other person acting in a 
fair manner. The following review of difference aversion, on the other hand, discusses fairness 
from the viewpoint of discrepancies in wealth division between people.  
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2.5.2. Difference aversion 
Difference aversion refers to a personal preference towards inequality reduction. Inequality 
aversion manifests in individuals taking action to reduce differentials. Inequality reduction could 
results from sacrificing a person’s own payoff or by taking a conscious action to lower other’s 
payoffs in order to advance a more equitable situation. As discussed previously in the section on 
reference person selection, psychological research has recognized comparison to social reference 
prior to it being considered in the field of economics. Theories such as the social comparison 
theory and equity theory captured the basic idea of difference aversion in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  
In social comparison theory, people have a need to evaluate themselves to other people (Festinger 
1954). In Festinger’s paper, a comparison is always more meaningful as the similarity between 
people increases. Importantly, as the differences within a social group increase, both the group 
and individual members will be motivated to reduce the differences. In a case of two people, the 
person taking note of the discrepancy between her and the reference person would be motivated 
to reduce the difference. Whereas social comparison theory deals with ability and opinions 
between people, equity theory deals more narrowly with work effort and payoffs resulting from 
effort. 
Equity theory in social psychology describes reactions similar to the social comparison theory. 
Equity theory was created to explain how people evaluate fairness of income difference. 
According to Adams (1963), people evaluate their own ratio of rewards and effort to the ratios of 
reward and effort of others. If others have a notably higher ratio of rewards to effort, the 
individual observing this difference will begin to feel displeasure and is motivated to correct the 
situation. For example, if person A’s colleagues were to receive a larger compensation for the 
same work that person A is doing, A would feel unfairly treated. 
In the realm of economics, one of the first experiments estimating the effect of difference in 
payoffs on utility between two players was Loewenstein et al. (1989). The estimated social utility 
function resulting from this study has a tent shape: players exhibit the highest utility when there is 
no difference between payoffs. If a player is behind another player, utility for this player rises 
steeply as the discrepancy between players decreases. On the other hand, estimated utility of a 
player is not strictly increasing as the difference to another player increases advantageously. 
Rather, it is convex and downward sloping. These results would support the hypothesis that 
reducing differences between people is an important consideration in decision making. 
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Graph 4: Development of utility for individual   as the payoff difference first decreases and then 
increases to the advantage of   (Loewenstein et al. 1989) 
Clark and Oswald (1996) further research that a person’s satisfaction depends on income relative 
to others by going through data from the 1991 British Household Panel Survey. Clark and Oswald 
find no correlation between absolute earnings and self-reported job satisfaction. Instead, higher 
income relative to similar peers’ income is related to a higher self-reported job satisfaction. This 
study does not comment on the form of a possible utility function over the difference between 
individuals. It simply provides evidence that interpersonal comparison can have an effect on the 
satisfaction experienced by people and thus, could more likely influence decision making as well. It 
also seems to contradict the research by Loewenstein et al. by implying that utility increases as the 
advantageous difference increases. 
Continuing difference aversion research, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) begin with the assumption that 
people dislike outcomes which promote inequality and build a simple model to describe the effect 
on decision making. A simple version of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 822) model contains two 
people. In the below depiction,     denotes the monetary payoff of individual  ,    denotes the 
payoff of individual  ,    and    describe the effects of inequality on utility. 
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              [       ]                 
Additionally,       and       . This is intuitively sensible as an increase in inequality is at 
least as detrimental for utility when person   is behind person   in payoffs compared to person   
being ahead. In other words, the effect of advantageous inequality on utility is smaller than 
disadvantageous utility. As mentioned by Fehr and Schmidt, this relationship between    and    is 
supported by results from Loewenstein et al. (1989) as the slope of the utility function is steeper 
when the person at a disadvantage makes the comparison. This is also evident from the left side of 
Graph 4. Loewenstein et al. (1989) also predict that the utility for an individual would decrease as 
her payoffs increase, provided that difference to the reference person also increases. This would 
translate to     , when   is ahead in payoff, and it does not seem sensible that individual utility 
would decrease as payoff increases, even if social differences grow. 
Values      are therefore not considered in the model, as this would suggest that a person gains 
disutility for each dollar they get and that grows the payoff difference      , when ahead of 
another person. Even if     , person   would always prefer decreasing        instead of taking 
money herself and this too, seems unrealistic. In prospect theory presented later, one could 
consider that the reference point for    is   . The social utility function resembles a linear version 
of the prospect theory’s valuation function when utility of person   is graphed over       with    
increasing. Below is a depiction of the social utility function described above, where    remains 
constant and    is increasing. The bend in the curve is where       and towards the right from 
there      . 
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Graph 5: The social utility function from Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as    increases and    remains 
constant 
This model implies that people would be willing to sacrifice their own payoff if the opponent’s 
payoff is reduced by a certain amount. More specifically, a person with a payoff   , where (   
  ), would be willing to sacrifice this payoff if it leads to the reference person losing at 
least             . As it was assumed that     , decreasing the other person’s payoff when 
ahead does not increase one’s utility and thus sacrificing payoffs to decrease the payoffs of other 
players makes no sense. Rather, people wish to aid those who are behind in order to reduce the 
difference between payoffs. The propensity to sacrifice one’s payoffs in order to aid people who 
are behind in payoffs depends on how the sacrifice affects difference in payoffs         and on 
the size of   .  
This model can also explain reciprocal behavior explained through Rabin’s (1993) model. In the 
ultimatum game, an offer is accepted if the utility is above zero. Offers, where over half of the 
divisible sum is offered, are always accepted as these are always positive. But when the offered 
sum is less than half, it depends on  of the accepting player. Let’s consider an example where 
players   and   are playing the ultimatum game. Player   offers a division where payoff is smaller 
for player   (     ). This offer is only accepted if   is such that the division does not produce 
negative utility from the difference in payoffs. In this case it should fill the condition for   as 
presented below. 
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Even though the model presented here can explain behavior in the ultimatum game, it cannot 
account for behavior in other cases. One such case is a public good game without punishment 
previously examined with Sudgen’s reciprocity model. In this public good game, most people seem 
to behave in an unfair way, contradicting predictions of the difference aversion model presented 
here. This may be due to there being several players participating in the experimental games. Fehr 
and Schmidt theorize that when a game consists of several players and some fractions of the 
players have purely selfish motives; it is possible that people disregard inequality concerns and 
only attempt to maximize their own payoff (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, p. 834). 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) present another difference aversion model, the Equity, Reciprocity 
and Competition model (ERC), where the individual’s utility is replaced by a motivation function    
for person  . This motivation function is dependent on the size of the payoff individual   receives 
(  ) and her share of the total payoff (  ).  
            
Value function is increasing in    and decreases as    distances itself from the socially equitable 
share, which would be dividing the total payoff equally among   people. ERC bases the decision 
making explanations on the individual’s share of the total payoff available for division, and as such 
is not as relevant for this paper. 
The difference aversion models assume people perceive the fairness of distribution as a key 
ingredient of their decision making process. In addition to difference aversion and reciprocal 
behavior, there exists evidence that people could be motivated by maximizing the payoff of all 
participants even if payoff differences are increased as a result.  
 
2.5.3. Social-welfare preferences 
Social-welfare preferences mean individuals attempt to maximize social-welfare by making 
decisions which result in the greatest combined utility (Yaari & Bar-Hillel 1984). When maximizing 
the overall utility is a prime concern, individuals are not attempting to maximize their own 
monetary payoff or averting distribution differences. In addition to maximizing combined utility of 
35 
 
individuals, people care about helping those who are worse off more than of helping those who 
are relatively well off. Difference aversion is not considered an overriding priority. 
 
Andreoni and Miller (2002) identify the prevalence of different preferences from an experiment 
where participants decide on how much surplus they share with another anonymous player. In 
this experiment, about half of the participants (47.2 percent) were identified as selfish, one-third 
(30.4 percent) as acting according to difference aversion and one-fifth (22.4 percent) as 
attempting to maximize overall utility. Charness and Rabin (1999), and Charness and Grosskopf 
(2001) provide additional evidence on the fact that people are concerned increasing overall 
payoffs, even if these decisions lead to increasing inequality. 
 
Charness and Grosskopf (2001) report, that when a person’s own payoff is fixed, she is not too 
concerned with distributional fairness of payoffs. In fact, when given the decision on how much to 
allocate for another person, it does not seem to matter if this allocated sum exceeds their own 
payoff. These observations would be in line with maximizing the utility of all participants instead of 
attempting to avoid differences in payoffs. In study 1 of Charness and Grosskopf (2001) one 
participant always has a fixed payoff of 600 pesetas and they had to decide whether to allocate 
the other player with 600 or 900 pesetas in one decision and 600 or 400 in another. In the first 
allocation decision, most people (65.6 percent) chose to allocate the other player a high amount 
of 900 pesetas. In the second decision, the difference was even clearer as 88.5 percent chose to 
allocate the other participant 600 instead of 400.  
 
Another interesting finding was that participants were willing to sacrifice a small amount of their 
own payoff if it leads to large gains for another person. This could be seen as the opposite of 
difference aversion models where people were willing to sacrifice some of their own payoff in 
order to reduce the other player’s payoff. In Charness and Grosskopf (2001) study 2, 66.7 percent 
chose to allocate another participant 1200 and themselves 600 pesetas, instead of allocating both 
625 pesetas. Social-welfare maximizing behavior is mainly observed in empirical experiments and 
no model describing simply these preferences has been presented. The composite model including 
all three social preferences considerations models social-welfare maximization along with 
reciprocity and difference aversion.  
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2.5.4. Composite Model 
Incorporating reciprocity, difference aversion and social-welfare preferences, Charness and Rabin 
(2002) construct a model which integrates the three fields of social preferences presented before. 
The utility function weighs payoffs for two players and considers how the payoffs relate to each 
other. Below is a formulation of the social preferences model presented in Charness and Rabin 
(2002). In this utility function for player   ,    and    indicate payoffs for players   and   
respectively.   
                                              
    and     if       
    and     if       
    and     if       
     if B has been unkind to player A and     otherwise 
In addition to the multipliers, there also exist three parameters. Here   models reciprocity and is 
“crudely” defined by Charness and Rabin as     when     . Reciprocity is not directly in 
focus of this paper and thus, this definition does not need to be more elaborate. The relationships 
of   and   define more finely how observations of the other player’s payoffs effect utility. 
A general case where player   feels positive or at least neutral towards  , parameters can be 
defined as        . With such parameters, player   receives additional utility when either 
player’s payoff increases. No disutility is created by increasing either payoff, although, player   
would prefer increasing    over   . This parameter setting is related to the preference towards 
maximizing social-welfare as mentioned in the previous section. Assume       , now increasing 
    by sacrificing    seems acceptable to   if   
 
 
. If the payoff   sacrificed by   increases     
by   , the parameter should fulfill   
 
   
 in order for the sacrifice be meaningful. 
By modifying the parameters further, it is possible to model difference aversion instead of 
maximization of social-welfare. If   receives disutility as the payoff difference compared to   
grows, the following parameter specification would be valid:       and       .  With 
these parameters, Charness and Rabin model of social preferences gives similar results to the Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999) model on difference aversion presented previously. 
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With the different parameter specifications this model can describe the various behavior patterns 
described as social preferences. The model will be used later to predict how different preferences 
could affect decision making when possible results from the experiment are assessed. As 
mentioned before, the social preferences model acts as a utility function for the expected utility 
model. An alternative for the expected utility is the prospect theory presented in the next section. 
 
2.6. Prospect theory 
Prospect theory has its roots in empirical inconsistencies observed with the expected utility theory 
in situations containing risk. In certain empirical studies on individual decision making, such as in 
the Allais paradox (Allais 1953), expected utility theory incorrectly predicts choices of participants. 
First, three problems identified in expected utility theory will be presented here. These include the 
certainty effect, reflection effect and the isolation effect. After reviewing the problems, the 
prospect theory model will be examined as a new model attempting to address these issues.  
 
2.6.1. Problems with the axiom of independence 
Consider the following rationality assumption presented in the expected utility section, also 
known as axiom of independence. The axiom states that if   is preferred over   and both 
alternatives are manipulated identically, preference order should remain unchanged. Below is a 
mathematical presentation of this axiom where   is a third alternative.  
          ;       
                                
Experimental problems presented to individuals have found evidence contradicting this axiom of 
which Kahneman and Tversky (1979) present several examples. First contradiction reviewed is 
called the certainty effect. Participants in an experiment chose between two options in two 
problems presented to them. The first problem consisted of gambles   and  . The second decision 
making problem consisted of gambles   and . 
PROBLEM 1:                                              
PROBLEM 2:                                             
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When presented with this choice, 82 percent of the participants chose   over  . When presented 
with the second choice problem, however, 83 percent of the participants chose   over . This 
would seem to contradict the axiom of independence, since   and   were manipulated identically 
to come up with choices   and . This equates to the following change, assuming      . 
                              
                                                    
                      
Assuming that an individual uses the same utility function to evaluate probabilities, decreasing the 
probability of receiving 2400 in both alternatives   and   should not change the order they are 
preferred in. This contradiction is caused by the certainty effect; participants prefer more certain 
outcomes to uncertain ones. This preference leads to inconsistent predictions by the expected 
utility theory as it predicts preferences would remain constant despite the operation performed 
on both choices. 
Reflection effect is the second problem, qualities of which were originally theorized of by 
Markowitz (1952). The reflection effect leads people to reverse their preferences for gambles 
when all of the outcomes are multiplied by -1, all other things equal. It would imply that, for 
example, a risk avoider presented with positive outcomes would become a risk lover when 
presented with negative outcomes. For example, examine the following example.  
PROBLEM 1:                                          
PROBLEM 2:                                     
In Kahneman and Tversky (1979), presenting the first problem to participants led to 80 percent of 
them to choose   over  . However, when presented with problem 2, 92 percent of participants 
chose   over . Clearly, the preferences towards risk were reversed by simply switching the sign 
of possible payoffs. In other words, majority of the participants evaluated the first problem using a 
concave utility function and the latter using a convex utility function. If the independence axiom 
would hold, this would not occur.  
The third problem presented by Kahneman and Tversky is called the isolation effect. Isolation 
effect means that individuals concentrate on facts that separate different decisions and neglect to 
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account for the facts that are common to them when evaluating choices under risk. Below is 
another example from Kahneman and Tversky (1979). For the first problem, participants are 
endowed with 1000 before having to answer the question and in the second problem they are 
endowed with 2000 beforehand.  
PROBLEM 1:                                        
PROBLEM 2:                                    
Now the starting situation has been manipulated so that participants should be indifferent 
between   and  , and   and  according to EUT. However,   was chosen over   by 84 percent of 
the participants and   was chosen over D by 69 percent. Instead of considering the different end 
results of the whole game, participants instead conform to the reflection effect when evaluating 
choices.  
 
2.6.2. Prospect theory model 
As the presented problems decreased the apparent descriptive power of the expected utility 
theory, a new theory was developed to solve these issues and model decision making under risk. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) presented an alternative model to the EUT called prospect theory. 
In this model, people evaluate outcomes based on a point of reference and an outcome’s distance 
to that reference point. The prospect theory model consists of two parts: value function and 
weighting function. Value function in this model is not based on the absolute amount of final 
wealth the outcome would provide. Choice valuation is instead dependent on difference between 
a possible outcome and a person’s reference point. As the difference between an outcome and 
the reference point grows, the valuation of that outcome either increases or decreases. Valuation 
is related to utility so that a person’s utility increases (decreases) as the valuation increases 
(decreases). 
The value function also has two important properties: increasing distance to reference point has a 
diminishing effect on the valuation and loss aversion is modeled with the valuation curve being 
steeper in the vicinity of the reference point. Diminishing effect feature of the value function 
means that additional increases of the same size to the distance from a reference point will 
produce smaller changes in the value function as the distance grows. In other words, value 
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function presents diminishing marginal value, the further one travels away from the reference 
point. Due to this feature, the valuation graph is convex for losses and concave for gains. A graph 
presenting a valuation function with these features is depicted below and is based on Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979).  
 
Graph 6: Value function around a reference point as in Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
The reference point in this graph is at zero in the middle with gains extending to the right and 
losses to the left. To the left, the curve is steeper as losses are valued to be more severe than gains 
of the same size. From the slope around the reference point, it is clear that the impact of changes 
around the reference point have a larger impact on the value function than changes that are 
distant from the point. Depending on the chosen reference point, or points, a certain financial 
standing can be interpreted either as a gain or a loss.  
In addition to the value function, individual perception of the probability ( ) has an effect on the 
choice. This perception of probability is called the weighting function    , as prospect theory 
states that people do not objectively evaluate probabilities. Rather, they overweigh small 
probabilities and assign smaller weighs to high probabilities (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, pp. 
283). This leads to small probabilities affecting decisions as if they were higher than objective 
evaluation would lead one to think. Conversely, high probabilities are weighed as if they were 
smaller than an objective evaluation would suggest. Exactly which probabilities are then 
overweighed and which ones are underweighted? Empirical experiments estimate the function to 
be s-shaped, with probabilities under approximately 0.3-0.4 being underweighted and the rest 
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overweighed to some extent (Prelec 1998). Below is a depiction of the weighting function as 
depicted by Prelec.  
 
Graph 7: Thick line presents the probability weighting function for prospect theory over the 
dashed gradient with a slope of 1 (Prelec 1998) 
As mentioned before, the chosen reference point has a large effect on how an outcome is 
perceived. There are several options which could be used as a reference point and people can 
even have several competing reference points at once (Baucells et al. 2011). Status quo, 
expectations of future outcomes, personal goals or social comparison could act as reference points. 
Traditionally, prospect theory states that status quo should serve as the main reference point. For 
example, in gambling situations it makes sense to evaluate success by comparing the difference of 
resulted wealth situations to the initial wealth standing. However, later research has presented 
evidence that people evaluate multiple reference points according to the available information. 
Ordóñez, Connolly and Coughlin (2000) present evidence that people evaluate outcomes such as 
salary not only according to the absolute amount of salary received, but also according to how 
much wage their reference persons are receiving. People simultaneously evaluate the change 
from status quo and fairness. Furthermore, these several reference points may provide conflicting 
information on whether a person should feel good or bad about an outcome. This means that 
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multiple reference points can affect decision making simultaneously instead of a person only 
considering a single reference at a given moment (Koop and Johnson 2010). Unfortunately, it is yet 
impossible to say how much various types of reference points influence decision making and what 
the relative impacts of different reference points would be.  
People’s expectations could be used in reference formation. When exact probabilities are not 
available, people form expectations of the likelihood of future outcomes. Köszegi and Rabin (2006) 
describe how expectations people hold of the future outcomes can be used as a reference. People 
form a probabilistic belief of a certain outcome when they start focusing on a decision and use this 
as a reference point to evaluate the actual outcome of their decision. It is important to note that 
according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006), reference points are formed prior to the realization of 
actual outcomes. Actual outcomes are then perceived as gains or losses, depending on how they 
relate to the reference point formed earlier. Even increases in wealth can be perceived as losses 
by the individuals if the realized outcome is lower than that which they expected. For example, if a 
person expects to receive a pay raise of 1000 euros with 70 percent probability she would use 700 
euros as her reference point. However, if she in reality only receives a 500 euro raise, the 200 euro 
difference to the reference point would be perceived as a loss even though her wage increased. 
Personal goals can also function as points of reference. In psychology, goals can be actual rewards 
or simply set levels of performance without an actual reward attached to it. Psychological research 
has also shown that people’s performance levels are higher when they have goals, compared to 
situations where people are told to do their best. Heath et al. (1999) tie together the concept of 
goals and prospect theory to explain motivation and effort levels in various tasks which contain no 
rewards. One such example used by Heath et al. is setting a performance goal in a given sport 
event. Depending on how people of same attributes set their goals, similar levels of performance 
might seem either inadequate or good depending on how they relate to the personal goals. For 
example, assume people   and   usually train by swimming the same distance of 1000 meters. 
Now   and   set diverging goals:   sets the goal to swimming 2000 meters during their next 
training whereas   sets the normal goal of 1000 meters. They both then swim 1500 meters. As 
would seem natural,   is predicted to feel more negative and should also exert more effort on 
attempting to reach her goal of 2000 meters. On the other hand,   is predicted to feel happy 
about her performance but is also expected to be less motivated to keep swimming after 
exceeding her own target. Goal thus acts as a reference point and the slope of the value function 
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predicts motivation to exert additional effort. What qualifies as a personal goal is not strictly 
defined and thus leaves the possibility of more personal motivations open. 
People could also form references through social comparison processes as implied already by the 
previous example of evaluating the fairness of a wage. As discussed previously in the review of 
psychological research on social comparison, people have a tendency to evaluate themselves to a 
social reference group.  For example, one could be estimating her accuracy and refer to another 
person completing the same task in order to evaluate success. Boksem et al. (2010) show that 
participants in time estimation tasks react both to relative success and to their actual end results 
in estimation tasks. In this experiment, both participants were shown their own results and the 
result of the other participant after each estimation task. Payoffs were dependent on individual 
performance and were independent of the other participant’s success. Nevertheless, participants 
reacted more strongly to situations where they lost and the other participant succeeded 
compared to a situation where they both lost. More specifically, they experienced a stronger error 
signal when they failed and the other player succeeded.  
Negotiations are a field where social comparison affects negotiator’s evaluation of success 
(Novemsky and Schweitzer 2004). Novemsky and Schweitzer show that satisfaction of negotiators 
is dependent on social comparison. More interestingly, in the realm of social comparison the 
amount, for example monetary amount, by which a social reference person is won, is less 
important - negotiators simply have a preference towards outperforming others. As the 
experiments used undergraduate students instead of seasoned negotiators, it can easily be 
imagined that these students or people in general, would form reference points at least in part 
through social comparison.  
It is largely unknown how people evaluate reference points, especially when there are several 
plausible options available. Kahneman (1992) acknowledges the need for further research in 
situations where people identify several reference points. Papers such as Baucells et al. (2011) 
complement reference point formation research in the realm of reference prices but research on 
what moderates the effect of social comparison on decision making is largely absent. The 
empirical experiment presented later on will in part study if social comparison can have a 
noticeable effect on a person’s reference point. Now that the main economic theories have been 
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reviewed, the following sections will present psychological factors which may affect decision 
making: social pressure and emotions. 
 
2.7. Effect of social pressure on decision making 
The effect of social pressure on decision making has been explored in psychology for a good part 
of the last century. Asch (1951) presents evidence that other people’s explicit opinions can lead 
people to provide wrong answers in experimental setting, or at least that these opinions affect 
their perception of the correct answer. Another important paper by Milgram (1963) shows that 
people administer dangerous levels of electric shocks to supposed subjects in learning 
experiments when they are simply told to do so. Over 60 percent of the participants administered 
the highest possible shock when told to do so, regardless of explicit pain expressed by an actor 
portraying the learning experiment subject. Obviously, in both of these classical experiments social 
pressure made the participants act contrary to their beliefs and encouraged them to defy logical 
reasoning. Both of these experiments also rely on external authority exercising explicit power over 
the subject. With this in mind, further research provides evidence that people’s behavior can be 
modified by a simple presence of peers as well.  
In a more recent study, Gardner and Steinberg (2005) write that people exhibit more risk taking 
when they are in peer groups by focusing more on the possible payoffs of risky behavior than 
potential costs or losses. In this study, a peer group of 2 other participants was compared to 
completing experiments alone. The simple presence of peers was enough to increase actual risky 
behavior in the experimental game. In addition to risk taking, social pressure can also affect 
performance and motivation in tasks requiring effort from the participants. Falk and Ichino (2006) 
experimented on how people perform individually versus pairs in a simple task of filling envelopes. 
Even though participants were paid independent of output, pairs of participants exhibited 
significantly higher productivity when compared to individuals - this would imply that presence of 
a peer increases the level of effort put into completing a task. Higher effort implies that 
participants feel increased motivation to reach higher levels of productivity.  
Mas and Moretti (2006) provide more evidence by studying how high performing workers affect 
other workers’ productivity working in the vicinity at a grocery checkout counter. Mas and Moretti 
find that introducing highly productive workers also increases the effort level of workers who 
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previously exhibited lower productivity. It is important to note that the positive spillover effects 
only apply for less productive workers who can visibly observe the worker of higher productivity 
being ahead of them and that the effects are observed regardless of limited economic incentives. 
Additionally, physical distance to the reference point influences the effect a reference person can 
have on behavior. Higher distance makes careful observation of comparison point more difficult 
and decreases the spillover effects. Vice versa, a decreasing distance would lead to increasing 
spillover effects. 
Overall empirical evidence points to the fact that social pressure does have an effect on decision 
making of individuals. Also, it is important that the comparable individuals’ – to which own 
productivity is compared – performance can be explicitly observed. As people yield to social 
pressure, they accept higher levels of risk more freely neglecting possible losses and accentuating 
the possible positive outcomes. These aspects combine the important implications for this paper: 
visibility and effect on behavior. The next chapter will present what moods reference person 
comparison can invoke and how these are hypothesized to affect behavior.   
 
2.8. Effect of emotions on decision making 
This final section of the theoretical review focuses on previous research on emotions and decision 
making. Emotions and moods can have various channels through which they influence decision 
making, such as affecting subjective evaluations on different decisions and expectations of future 
outcomes. Two opinions also exist on how different moods affect evaluations. However, it is good 
to start from the early observations of effects of emotions on people by Isen and Shalker and 
move onwards from there. 
Isen and Shalker (1982) induced different moods on participants and found that different mood 
states had effects on how these students evaluated different stimuli. Negative moods lead to 
more negative evaluations and positive moods, naturally, lead to more positive evaluations. The 
study states that mood states divert attention away from the attributes of the stimulus being 
shown to them or distorts it according to the different mood being experienced by the participant 
at the moment. Mood of the participant can especially affect evaluation of objects that are 
ambiguous in nature. That is, they are neither clearly positive nor negative. (Isen and Shalker 1982) 
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If moods do affect evaluations, what is the process through which this effect occurs? According to 
Loewenstein and Lerner (2003), emotions can have an effect decision making in two ways: 
through expected emotions and immediate emotions. Expected emotions are the emotional states 
the decision-maker expects to be related to different outcomes of decisions and immediate 
emotions are the emotions that are experienced when the decision is being made. It is worth 
noting that not all immediate emotions are necessarily related to the actual decision at hand but 
could, for example, result from something the decision-maker has experienced previously during 
the same day.  
Regarding expected emotions, people react to relative changes in their situation instead of 
absolute consequences and they compare the outcomes also to those outcomes which did not 
materialize (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). One could think of this process to functioning similar 
to the valuation function in prospect theory. Regret is a good example of comparing realized 
results to outcomes that could have been but never were. However, emotions expected to be 
experienced through materialization of outcomes tend to be exacerbated and people expect to 
feel better (or worse) in different situations than they actually do when the objective 
circumstances change (Loewenstein and Frederick 1997). It seems people adapt to changing 
situations, and recognize this adaptation, but still do not account for adaptation in their future 
expectations. This basically leads to the fact stated earlier that people overestimate the resulting 
feelings, and also the duration of those feelings, related to various outcomes. 
Expected emotions affect the emotional evaluation of various outcomes related to different 
choices in decision making but immediate emotions are salient at the time when a decision is 
being made. Immediate emotions can affect decision making by modifying how people perceive 
expected emotions and by changing the information processing quality or quantity of an individual 
(Loewenstein and Lerner 2003). Intensity of these immediate emotions has an effect on how 
strongly they affect the decision making but even at the lower levels, they should have an effect 
on at least how information regarding a judgment of a decision is formed. These lower levels of 
intensity do not overwhelm cognitive processing as may be the case for highly intensive emotions. 
Highly intensive emotions can have a stronger effect on individual’s decision making than would 
be sensible. For example, people suffering from agoraphobia may find it very difficult to leave 
their homes, or meet new people, which obviously disrupt their lives despite there being little 
cognitive reason for staying at home (Barlow 2004). (Loewenstein and Lerner 2003) 
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Naturally, agoraphobia is an extreme case but the effects on lower levels of emotional intensity 
provide insight into how emotions affect decision making in everyday situations. The channels 
through which emotions can change situational evaluations are now familiar but what kind of an 
effect could different mood and emotional states have on decision making? 
Two theories on how different moods affect judgment can be identified: mood-maintenance 
hypothesis (MMH) and affect infusion model (AIM). MMH would suggest that when people are in 
a positive mood, they are less likely to take high risks (Isen and Patrick 1983). Conversely, when 
people are experiencing sadness, they are more willing to take higher risks (Raghunathan and 
Tuan Pham 1999). The basic idea of MMH thus is that people in positive states of mind wish to 
maintain this positive feeling and want to avoid risk-taking, whereas people experiencing sadness 
want to alleviate their negative feelings and accept taking more risks as a method to reach that 
goal. All negative moods do not have the same effect on risk-taking, however. For example, 
sadness induces more risky behavior, whereas people experiencing anxiety wish to avoid risks 
even though both are negative feelings (Raghunathan and Tuan Pham 1999). Distinctive types of 
feelings thus can have different effects on behavior regardless of whether they are broadly 
defined as positive or negative. However, as there is no comprehensive review of how the myriad 
different emotions affect decision making and it makes sense to concentrate broad definitions 
such as positive and negative moods. 
Affect infusion model, on the other hand, predicts contrary behavior to the MMH. According to 
AIM, people in a positive mood would be more willing to take risks and people experiencing 
negative moods would be less likely to take risks (Forgas 1995). Yuen and Lee (2002) studied risk 
taking tendencies in different mood states and found that people in depressed, or negative, 
moods were less prone to risk than individuals in positive or neutral moods. Furthermore, 
asymmetry was detected between the differences: positive and neutral moods did not induce 
significantly different levels of risk aversion, whereas negative moods caused higher risk aversion 
(Yuen and Lee 2002). The difference is due to a suggestion that positive moods increase the 
likelihood that a situation is seen in more of a positive light and accentuates the positive aspects of 
a risky decision (Chou et al. 2007). On the other hand, people in negative moods would 
concentrate on the threatening aspects of risky decisions and this would increase the likelihood of 
increasing risk aversion in their behavior.  
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It has been suggested that the AIM and MMH apply for different levels of motivation in people 
and that the level of motivation an individual has paves way for different ways moods affect 
behavior (Forgas 1995). When an individual is strongly motivated to reach a certain end state, the 
MMH would apply. Whereas lower levels of motivation could be associated with AIM (Chou et al. 
2007). Empirical evidence supporting both models exists and it cannot be clearly said which theory 
would apply in this paper’s empirical setting. What can be said with relative certainty is that 
emotions do have an effect on risk preferences. One interesting example is Shiv et al. (2005), 
where participants with brain injuries in emotion processing areas performed better in choosing 
among positive-expectation gambles. Injured participants were emotionally unaffected by gains 
and losses in a series of gambling tasks, and could thus maximize expected value better.  
This paper does not set out to prove either of the two theories to be valid or invalid. The point of 
this discussion was to familiarize the readers with the fact that emotions can indeed affect 
decision making and risk aversion in individuals. In this study the mood state of the participants 
will be measured before and after the experiment by a questionnaire following Mathews et al. 
(1995) and Yuen and Lee (2002). It is of interest whether the experimental game can alter the 
mood state of the participants and whether specific changes in the altered mood states correlate 
with varying risk behavior. 
There is knowledge of research studying how varying mood states and the prospect theory 
function together and this may provide some hints on how moods could affect decision making. 
Seo, Goldfarb and Barrett (2010) combine prospect theory with mood states and study how 
combinations of framing effect and different moods affect risk aversion. An experiment combining 
risk taking in investment decisions and measurement of mood states is performed in order to 
check the effects of different mood states in domains of gains and losses. They state that the 
effect of moods on risk taking depends on the framing of the current situation. Particularly, 
framing an outcome as a gain (loss) leads to pleasant feelings accentuating risk taking (risk 
aversion). Conversely, unpleasant moods decreased willingness to take risk in the domain of losses. 
No conclusive evidence is presented of positive mood affecting risk taking in the domain of losses. 
Results of Seo, Goldfarb and Barrett do not mean that mood states would predict risk taking 
better than the prospect theory. Rather, risk taking below the reference point is lower (higher) 
when negative (positive) moods are felt as compared to experiencing neutral moods. Feelings and 
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immediate emotions that are “extremely intense” could even overpower the prospect theory’s 
valuation function as a basis for evaluation and direct risk taking completely depending on the 
experienced moods. A more relevant notion is that experienced moods might shift the valuation 
and probability weighing functions. As there is no consensus on the effect of moods and emotions 
on decision making, it is difficult to make predictions based on the reviewed research. Different 
mood states of the participants will be measured in the experiment and this will shed more light 
into whether AIM of MMH is more prominently supported.   
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3. Hypothesis 
As seen in the previous sections, several different aspects can be used to examine what factors 
could affect risk aversion in individuals. In addition to the commonly researched attribute factors 
such as age and gender, external and situational factors such as social pressure can influence 
decision making containing risk. It would seem likely, that the preferred level of risk aversion in a 
given situation is a function of a risk aversion baseline and external factors which can alter risk 
aversion away from this baseline. The experiment detailed in the following chapter attempts to 
show that level of risk aversion will vary between different groups, depending on situational 
factors and on the observed reference persons. Situational factor in this study is the salience level 
of another player’s endowment and how it compares to the received endowment - which can be 
either higher or lower - given before the actual decision task.  
This paper will focus on a special case where a reference person’s endowment salience is 
controlled in three separate experiments and compared to two control experiments. It is of 
interest, whether this salience level has clear effects on the risk aversion level exhibited by the 
participants. Hypothesis is that more tangibly observing results higher than what the participant 
has attained will result in increased risk taking, when compared to the control groups. Conversely, 
those receiving the higher endowment are expected to exhibit lower risk taking when compared 
to the control groups. The theoretical predictions by different theories will now be presented in 
the same order the theoretical chapter was constructed. 
The social preferences model has two predictions, depending on how the parameters are chosen. 
With the parameters chosen for this paper, social preferences model supports the hypothesis. If 
parameters are specified as        , higher risk taking is not expected. Participants get no 
disutility from being behind the other participant. On the other hand, losses are not looming as 
large as usual since a part of the utility is derived from the endowment gained by the other 
participant. This would imply that the risk aversion for participants with high endowment would 
be lower. On the other hand, if parameters       and        are assumed, participants 
receive disutility from difference in payoffs. The latter parameter set will be used as it seems more 
likely to hold in the actual experiment. It is doubtful that people would derive almost equal utility 
from an unknown person’s payoff increases. With these parameters, any gain for a participant 
behind in monetary outcomes, which decreases the difference, is highly valued by that participant 
as utility is increased both by the decreasing difference in outcomes and increasing payoff. 
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Participants receiving higher endowment are predicted to be less risk averse - unless there is a risk 
of falling behind reference participants in endowment. 
Assume a lower endowment participant’s payoff remains the same, now a decrease of one euro 
would lead to high endowment participant’s utility changing by         . But any euro below 
the lower endowment participant’s outcome will lead to the high endowment participant’s euro 
amount providing negative utility in addition to having a lower payoff. If there is a risk of falling 
behind the other player, the higher endowment participant will avoid this risk. As mentioned 
before, the latter parameter setting seems more likely and will be used in predictions. Particularly 
in a situation where the participants are not expected to be familiar with each other, an 
assumption that participant utilities were only positively correlated with any participant’s increase 
in payoff seems exaggerated. It seems doubtful that participants would experience no competitive 
instinct and would receive increased utility without social consideration of relative positions.  
Overall, it seems justified to use the latter set of parameters, which support the hypothesis.  
Risk preferences could change between experiments in the social preferences model if the 
parameters   and   would change. Consider the following functions depicting the social 
preferences theory in two distinct situations. In the first function, participant   has a higher 
outcome and in the latter, participant   has a higher payoff. For both functions, assume that 
reciprocity considerations are not taken into account. With these functions depicting utility 
changes (   ) in response to changes in payoffs (    and    ), we can examine how parameter 
changes would affect marginal utility in each case. 
                               
                               
As the social preferences model parameters are defined as       , it is easy to see how 
changes in both parameters would change risk preferences. An increase in both parameters would 
result in the utility function’s slope value being lower both when ahead and behind in outcome. An 
increase in   would decrease marginal utility when ahead of a reference person in payoff and 
increasing   would lead to a decrease when behind. Conversely, a decrease in both parameters 
leads to the resulting slope value of the utility function being higher. Higher (lower) slope value 
leads to higher (lower) marginal utility per additional euro and thus increasing (decreasing) risk 
preference for the same amount of euros. According to the hypothesis, decreasing parameter 
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values would correspond with disadvantageous comparison and increasing parameters with 
advantageous comparison.  
Unlike with social preferences theory, prospect theory supports the hypothesis and involves no 
alternative parameters to choose from. According to Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory risk 
taking should increase for the low endowment participant and decrease for the high endowment 
participants. These results are predicted by prospect theory if observing the other player’s results 
influences reference point formation. If salience affects formation of the reference point, it will 
surely influence participant’s perception of their success and thus affect how individuals perceive 
the difference to their reference point relative to a lower tangibility situation. For the lower 
endowment participant, this would equal to being on the side of gains in Graph 6, and observing 
the visible score causing the reference point to shift rightwards. A higher salience level would 
cause a larger shift. With increased salience, any increase in score has higher value and seems 
more important. The reverse would be true for higher endowment participants: observing a lower 
payoff reference person leads to the reference point shifting towards left and lower marginal 
utility for additional euros. This means the higher endowment participant would be less inclined to 
accept higher levels of risk. This risk aversion would only increase as the tangibility of the low 
endowment participant’s results increase. This proposition is based on the fact that increasing 
salience is expected to have a larger effect on people’s reference point. As the experiments will 
only use equal opportunity gambles, there is no need to consider the probability weighing function 
and how it changes.  
Social pressure aspect of decision making should become more explicit by the increasing salience 
of the other player’s score and thus increase the frequency of risky choices. Seeing that they are 
behind a visible peer in score and higher risk level being the only way to attain higher score ( since 
no effort is modeled in the game), the players would accept higher levels of risk. Research on 
social pressure’s effect on chosen effort levels and risk taking is rather unified and thus it is 
possible to say that research on social pressure supports the hypothesis. 
The effect of emotions is ambiguous and depends heavily on which moods are evoked and salient 
at the moment for each participant. According to the affect infusion model, positive moods in 
participants would evoke higher risk and negative moods would lead to a preference of lower 
levels of risk taking. Mood-maintenance hypothesis, on the other hand, would predict the exact 
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opposite results. Measuring the participant’s mood state with a questionnaire directly after 
making the decision, but before any outcome is revealed, should yield more insight. It will be of 
interest what moods are present in participants receiving the different endowments and if these 
have any effect on the chosen risk levels. Also, one could consider how the expected emotions 
could influence evaluation of potential situations. As mentioned in the emotions section, expected 
emotions are often thought to be better or worse than they actually turn out to be. This could 
translate to low endowment participant’s exacerbating the expected feelings in case of winning 
gamble. Conversely, it could be that high endowment participants would expect to feel worse than 
they actually would in case they lose a gamble. However, there is no evidence on which aspects of 
expected outcomes the participants would focus on.  
Overall, it seems more likely that the risk taking will increase as a result of increasing the salience 
level as is supported by social preferences theory, prospect theory and research on social pressure. 
The following sections will introduce an empirical experiment designed to study the hypothesis 
presented here. Finally the expected results and possible implications of each will be explored. 
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4. Empirical Experiments 
The set of experiments described here studies whether risk taking in a gambling task will change 
as a result of increasingly visible social comparison. Salience of the other person’s results is 
controlled in the three last experimental stages by changing the description given to participants. 
In total, there will be five different experiments which include two control groups and three 
different levels of salience for the social comparison. Participants in all experiments are divided 
into two groups: those who are granted a higher endowment before the decision and those who 
are granted a lower endowment. High endowment will be 10 euros and the low endowment will 
be 5 euros in each experiment. All participants have only one choice containing risk; there is no 
possibility for interaction between several players or possibility for strategic consideration of a 
multi-stage game. In order to control for subjective viewing of probabilities, probabilities of 
winning and losing will be the same for all gambling decisions in all experiments. 
All experiments will include the same amount of participants. The basic structure of the 
experiment is that participants are split into two groups. One group will receive the higher and 
one the lower endowment. Both groups will then complete a task where they will choose how 
much of the endowment they gamble ( ). In the winning condition of the gamble, with probability 
of 0.5, the participant will receive double the gambled amount. In the losing condition, probability 
of 0.5, the participant will lose the gambled amount. In both cases, participants can keep the 
portion of endowment which was not gambled.  
Gamble:  G   
 
 
       
 
 
      
Finally, all participants will complete a questionnaire mapping the participant’s mood state similar 
to Mathews et al. (1995) and Yuen and Lee (2002). This questionnaire is included in the Appendix. 
Mood questionnaire consists of ten questions where participants self-report how they feel on an 
eight-point scale. Afterwards, it is possible to examine the answers and conclude whether positive 
or negative moods were dominant in the participant at decision time. As evident from the 
appendix, the ten questions consist of five pairs with each pair consisting of opposite statements. 
The actual mood will be evaluated by reversing one of the pair questions and evaluating the actual 
state as a combination of both questions in a pair. 
The first experiment will concentrate on the differences between two beginning endowments. The 
point is to see what the risk taking levels for the two beginning endowments would be, without 
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any social comparison or emotional aspects, as the participants are not told what endowments are 
given to how many participants. 
Second experiment will measure how knowing that other participants have received high or low 
endowment affects risk taking. However, in the second condition it is not explicitly told who 
receives what, focus will mainly be on how the disappointment or happiness from the received 
amount affects risk taking. 
Third experiment will add a more explicit social aspect as the participants are assigned to pairs, 
and out of each pair one will receive the high endowment and one the low endowment. Here it 
will be clear how one’s endowment relates to a specific social reference person – the paired 
participant. However, description of the endowments will not be comparative and the language 
does not encourage comparison to the other person. 
In the fourth experiment participants are again assigned a pair. This experiment will increase the 
salience level of social comparison by changing the description wording given to participants – 
otherwise the execution is similar to experiment number three. The description will emphasize the 
fact that a player is either a winner or a loser from the paired participants. 
Fifth experiment will begin as the two previous ones, but will also include an explicit comparison 
to the other player’s endowment in the participant’s description. As in the previous experiment, 
two endowments are worded to be a result of either winning or losing in the first stage. In 
addition, the description will include a text directly comparing the endowments of the two 
participants. 
It is expected that each experiment from one to five would increase risk taking for the low 
endowment group and decrease risk taking for the high endowment group on average. From first 
to second experiment, this increase should occur simply due to the inclusion of a social 
comparison aspect. From the third experiment onwards, the effect should be attributable to 
increasing salience of social comparison. The following sections will describe the five experiments 
in more detail and finally the possible result combinations and implications will be reviewed.  
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4.1. Experiment 1 
First experiment will begin with collecting all participants to a single room where the experiment 
proceedings will be explained. Participants will be told that each will be given an endowment and 
they have to decide how much of this endowment to play in the gambling game. Size and 
distribution of endowments will not be clarified to participants. They will not know that others 
might receive more or less. Each participant will then be given an envelope containing endowment 
information, answer space for the gambling game decision and the final mood mapping 
questionnaire. Half of the endowments will be EUR 5 and the other half EUR 10. Description of the 
endowment will be given as below for both groups. 
“You have been given 10 euros. Please complete the following gambling decision task as 
instructed and finally the mood mapping questionnaire.”  
“You have been given 5 euros. Please complete the following gambling decision task as instructed 
and finally the mood mapping questionnaire.” 
After completion of the decision and questionnaire, participants may proceed to exit the room. 
Outside, the answer sheets are collected, gambling task decision is recorded, outcome calculated, 
and finally the participant is paid the possible outcome and remaining endowment. 
Emotions and social pressure are expected to have no effect in this experiment. The expected 
result of this experiment depends on what is assumed of the participant’s utility function and 
reference point. Since there is no social aspect to this experiment, social preferences model will 
not be used to predict the results. Rather, simply the individual shapes of the utility function over 
wealth will lead to different risk taking behavior. Regardless of the different risk profiles, average 
gamble size is expected to increase as the endowment increases. This is because gamblers are 
assumed to present a similar portion of both endowment groups, gambling on average the same 
percentage of the endowment and they will have a greater amount of money to gamble with in 
the high endowment condition. 
Predictions of the prospect theory vary depending on how the endowment relates to an 
individual’s expectation. It is most likely safe to assume that both endowments are higher than the 
participants expect. This means the endowment will be understood as a gain leading to lower risk 
taking, particularly as the endowment size increases.  
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In both cases it will be of interest to observe solely the effect of initial endowment in this 
experimental setting. Gambling patterns and bet sizes in this experiment will act as a control 
group and reference for the future experiments.  
 
4.2. Experiment 2 
Second experiment will again begin with explaining the experiment proceeding to all participants. 
In this condition, participants will be told in the beginning that half of the participants will receive 
a high endowment and that half will receive a low endowment. They will not be told who receives 
which endowment. The only difference to the above experiment is that participants will know in 
which endowment group they are in. Descriptions of the different endowments are as in the 
previous experiment as well as final proceedings regarding payout and leaving the experiment. 
Predictions of the second experiment can incorporate the social preferences model in addition to 
prospect theory. It is assumed that the different endowment conditions will use each other as 
reference groups. Social preferences prediction, using the parameters defined in hypothesis-
section, is that participants in the lower endowment condition will exhibit higher risk taking when 
compared to the previous experiment. Participants in the higher endowment condition, on the 
other hand, will exhibit lower risk taking. This occurs due to the different utility function slope 
values these individuals have. As evident from graph 5, being behind a reference person (or a 
group) leads to a higher slope value, resulting in higher risk taking preference, compared to when 
one is ahead. 
In order to use prospect theory, assume participants set an equal expectation of both outcomes as 
their reference point (
 
 
    
 
 
      ). Now anyone in the low endowment condition would 
experience loss due to an outcome lower than their expectation. Experiencing loss leads to higher 
risk taking compared to the previous experiment. Conversely, the higher endowment condition 
will experience gain and exhibit lower risk taking when compared to the previous experiment. In 
addition to the expected outcome, people will likely consider a reference group when forming 
their reference point which will further increase the mentioned effects on risk taking. 
58 
 
Higher and lower endowment conditions will likely also lead to experiencing some degrees of 
pleasant and unpleasant moods. It will be of interest to observe, what changes in moods will occur 
as a result of participants now observing other possible endowment. 
 
4.3. Experiment 3 
The third experiment will begin with participants being assigned another participant as a pair 
during the experiment instructions phase. Instructor will advise that one participant from each 
pair will receive an endowment of 10 euros and the other an endowment of 5 euros. Two 
unmarked envelopes are then given to each pair, which contain the two potential endowments, 
choice task and mood questionnaire. Participants proceed to complete the choice problem and 
questionnaire. Envelope containing the choice task will mention the attained endowment size, as 
in experiment one, and instructions on how to complete the choice task and questionnaire. When 
complete, participants may proceed to exit the room where answers are collected, the result of 
their possible gamble is calculated and final outcomes are paid in cash. 
Main prediction from here on is that risk taking will increase for the low endowment condition in 
each experiment and decrease for high condition participants. Additionally, it is reasonable to 
suspect that increasing tangibility of other participants will lead to greater effect on other 
participant’s reference points or utility function parameters. For those in high endowment 
condition, including the other participant increasingly into one’s reference point formation will 
lead to an even increased sense of gain. The reverse applies for those in lower endowment 
condition. This would accentuate the risk preference and certainty preference for low and high 
conditions, respectively. 
 
4.4. Experiment 4 
This experiment will be executed as experiment 3 described above. However, this time the 
description of the received endowment in the experiment will be changed to reflect the difference 
between players more. The instructor will also refer to receiving a low endowment as a loss and 
receiving the high endowment as a win. The written description of the endowment in this 
experiment will be as follows. 
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“You were fortunate enough to win 10 euros. Please complete the following gambling decision 
task as instructed and finally the mood mapping questionnaire.” 
“You were unfortunate to lose and received only 5 euros. Please complete the following gambling 
decision task as instructed and finally the mood mapping questionnaire.” 
When the participants are complete with the decision task and questionnaire, they may proceed 
to return their decisions and be paid the calculated result of the gamble as in all of the previous 
experiments. Apart from the changes mentioned above, everything else will be executed similarly 
to past experiments. 
As presented in the theoretical review, effects exhibited by social pressure are expected to have 
an increasing effect on risk taking as the language is changed to bring out the comparative aspect 
more explicitly. Additionally, framing of the endowment as a result of either a loss or gain will 
likely further accentuate the effect of reference point perception on risk taking. Finally, the effect 
of loss condition player’s salience on the reference point of a win condition player - and vice versa 
- is expected to have continued effect as mentioned in previous experiments. That is, low (high) 
endowment groups are expected to exhibit increasing (decreasing) risk taking. The effect on social 
preferences model’s utility function is also likely to continue, with the marginal utility for high 
endowment condition participants decreasing and increasing for the low endowment condition 
participants. 
 
4.5. Experiment 5 
This experiment will be executed as experiment 4 described above with participants being again 
paired up and the proceedings explained. Instructors will refer to participants either winning 10 
euros or losing and receiving 5 euros in the instructional part. Participants are again given 
envelopes containing a description of the endowment as follows. 
“Congratulations! You were fortunate enough to receive 10 euros instead of the smaller 5 euros 
allocated to your pair. Please complete the following gambling decision task as instructed and 
finally the mood mapping questionnaire.” 
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“We are sorry. You were unfortunate and received the smaller endowment of 5 euros instead of 
the larger 10 euros allocated to your pair. Please complete the following gambling decision task as 
instructed and finally the mood mapping questionnaire.” 
As before, when participants are done with the decision task and questionnaire they may proceed 
to leave the experiment space and be paid the final outcome and the remaining endowment. 
This experiment is expected to exhibit highest levels of risk taking on the part of low endowment 
condition participants. On the other hand, risk taking should reach the lowest level in this 
experiment for the high endowment condition players. This experiment should lead to the 
subjective difference to reference point being perceived, on average, as the largest out all the 
experiments mentioned here. Additionally, the marginal utility should be lowest for the high 
endowment participants and highest for low endowment participants, out of all experiments. 
The last section of this paper will discuss some possible results that could be obtained and what 
the implications of those results would be. 
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5. Possible results and interpretations 
The expected result is that, following the hypothesis, risk taking will gradually increase from the 
first to the fifth experiment with each experiment leading to higher risk taking levels compared to 
the previous one. There are several different factors why this is expected to happen, such as 
stronger inclusion of observations of other player’s outcomes in reference point formation, 
changing social preference model parameters in response to stronger salience and effect of social 
pressure. However, the effect of different mood states will be more difficult to predict. Possible 
different outcomes and their implications are discussed and formalized below. 
Firstly, unchanged risk aversion throughout the experiments could be coupled with mood 
measurements which are stable for both endowment groups in each experiment. This would lead 
to likely conclusions that either the experimental structure has failed to represent a meaningful 
decision situation for the participants or that social comparison simply does not have an effect on 
risk taking. Considering the previous empirical evidence, the first conclusion would seem more 
likely. Structure of the experiment should be examined and revised in order to present a more 
meaningful decision problem for future participants. 
What if risk taking would change in the second experiment in comparison to the first but remain 
constant after that? If mood measurements also register a change between the first two 
experiments, it could be possible that social comparison and feelings can have an effect on risk 
taking. However, salience as a moderator for risk taking would seem to be less meaningful. A 
change in risk taking between the two first experiments is necessary in showing that simply being 
aware of the possible endowments and their distribution can have an effect on risk taking 
behavior - even though completely objective consideration of the gambling decision should not be 
affected by this change. If this initial change in risk preferences observed, it is clearly more likely 
that further changes in salience will have a meaningful impact on behavior. From prospect 
theory’s point of view, these results would imply that knowledge of the distribution of 
endowments would affect reference point formation but increasing salience probably does not 
moderate this effect. This means that the initial knowledge on whether a person has received a 
high or a low endowment would influence reference point formation but changing salience would 
not further increase perceived distance to reference point. For example, for the high endowment 
condition, knowledge that half of the participants receive less would shift the reference point 
towards the left and thus increase perceived difference to reference point. This on the other hand 
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would lead to lower marginal valuation for each additional euro, leading to decreased preference 
for risk. However, increases in the salience of the reference person’s results do not cause further 
changes in the reference point or how one’s own distance to reference point is perceived. In terms 
of social preferences theory, it is clear that observing higher reference person’s results will cause 
the slope value of the utility function to be steeper compared to a situation where one is ahead 
(see Graph 5). As was the case for prospect theory, obtaining these results would suggest 
tangibility has little meaning in moderating preference for risk so further changes in the social 
preferences model are not expected.  
Another hypothesized outcome from the second experiment onwards would be gradually 
changing risk taking in response to the increasing salience of other participant’s endowment 
outcome and social comparison. More specifically, high endowment condition is expected to 
exhibit decreased risk taking and low endowment condition is expected to exhibit increased risk 
taking. This type of risk taking results could be coupled with either an observation of varying or 
constant mood states. Constant mood states are defined so that high and low condition 
participants would report mood states greatly similar to prior experiments. With constant mood 
states, the connection between risk taking and mood states measured by the questionnaire would 
be unclear. One reason could be the limited length of the questionnaire being unable to detect 
more subtle changes in participant mood states. Another reason could be the self-reporting nature 
of the questionnaire and the fact that people might not report their mood changes accurately 
enough. Varying mood states with no clear relation to the clearly observable risk taking 
development throughout the different experiments would also lead to an inconclusive result. 
Again it would seem likely that the mood questionnaire should be revised due to previous 
empirical evidence that moods and decision making are related.  
Gradually changing risk preference would mean that salience of social comparison, in addition to 
the actual comparison, has an effect on reference point formation in prospect theory and size of 
parameters affecting utility function slope in social preferences theory. One could think that, even 
though the knowledge of other participant’s results is available at the earlier levels, it becomes 
gradually more meaningful and increasingly used in decision making as the salience increases. In 
prospect theory, perceived distance to the reference point is suspected to be greater for both 
endowment conditions in each successive experiment, leading to greater changes in preferred risk 
level. In graph 8, circles represent one’s perceived position in relation to the reference point in the 
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middle. In the domain of gains, a high endowment participant perceives her position to be moving 
to the right as salience increases. Conversely, in the domain of losses, a low endowment 
participant perceives her position to be moving to the left and further away from the reference 
point as salience increases. Upon obtaining this result, it could be possible to have more accurate 
information on how a reference point is formed and how social comparison affects this reference 
point.  
 
Graph 8: Hypothesized changes in the perceived positions of low (losses) and high (gains) 
endowment participants as the salience level gradually increases in experiments 
For social preferences model, the implied change resulting from increased salience is somewhat 
different. Different, as the perceived position relative to the reference point does not change. 
Rather, the marginal utility of additional payoff changes in two distinct ways for the two classes of 
participants. In social preference model presented earlier, these results would imply that the 
parameter   increases for a high endowment condition participant. This would cause their utility 
function’s slope value and marginal utility to decrease, resulting in decreased preference for risk. 
For a low endowment participant, a decrease in parameter   would cause the marginal utility to 
increase along with the preference for risk. The below graph depicts the effect of a decrease in   
and an increase in   on the utility function of individual   as the thicker line. Thus the gradual 
salience level increases result in increased slope value (risk taking) behind the reference person 
and decreased slope value (risk taking) ahead of the reference person. 
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Graph 9: Possible changes in the social preferences model as a result of increasing salience of 
social comparison 
In the case of varying mood states, with gradually increasing feeling of unpleasantness 
(pleasantness) for the low (high) endowment condition participants and increasing (decreasing) 
risk taking would provide support for the mood-maintenance hypothesis. The changes suggested 
before on social preferences model and prospect theory could, with these outcomes, be conveyed 
or amplified by the changing mood states. Increased risk taking could be related to stronger 
emotional reaction evoked by the more salient differences which eventually leads to mentioned 
changes the economic models. As mentioned before, this development could be explained by both 
prospect theory and social preferences theory. In prospect theory, perception of one’s own 
position in relation to the reference point would shift right (left) in each experiment for the high 
(low) endowment group as the salience increases (as depicted in graph 8). Even if we assume that 
the mood-maintenance hypothesis is valid, it is difficult to say whether changing mood states lead 
to the change in perception or simply moderate the effect.  
In social preferences theory, as defined before, increased tangibility would affect the parameter 
size. Parameters would decrease (increase) for the low (high) endowment participants increasing 
(decreasing) the slope of the utility function. As was the case for prospect theory, further research 
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would have to be conducted to reveal whether emotions and moods lead to the changes or just 
modify how strong these effects are. 
Finally, it is possible that risk taking remains little - or unchanged for low endowment condition 
and increases for the high endowment condition - while the mood measurements gradually 
change. This case would show support for the affect infusion model. This condition is slightly 
different from the previous possible where the MMH was proposed to be valid. In this condition, it 
can be said that emotions or mood states modify how strongly social comparison is perceived but 
they do not convey changes in risk taking. If moods conveyed changes, risk taking preference 
would not remain static over the several experiments as moods change simultaneously. Consider, 
for example, that low condition participants report gradually more unpleasant moods in every 
experiment. According to the affect infusion model, negative moods lead to more pessimistic 
estimates and subsequently, decreased preference for risk. On the other hand, high endowment 
condition would show increased preference for risk. Risk taking remains little changed because 
increasing salience of social comparison and participant’s moods cause risk preferences to change 
to different directions causing the net effect on risk taking to be smaller than with previous results. 
This condition would also seem to confirm that salience of the social comparison does moderate 
the emotional reaction experienced by individuals. However, the increasingly negative feelings are 
negating the effect of increasing risk preference and vice versa. 
Overall, there are several possible combinations of outcomes possible. Especially due to the 
difficulty of predicting the effect of different mood states make accurate predictions of final 
behavior ambiguous. Due to the inconclusive nature of the predictions, it would be of interest to 
analyze actual experimental results. These results could then further help understand situational 
factors which may influence risk preferences and provide evidence on whether social preferences 
model and prospect theory should include the salience of social comparison in them.  
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6. Conclusion 
The experimental structure here is based on psychological and economic research and suggests 
that tangibility of social comparison has an effect on individual risk taking. Results supporting this 
hypothesis would have implications on how reference point comparison, and controlling the 
salience of this comparison, affects social preferences model and prospect theory. However, at 
this stage it is too early to mention how changes in mood and emotional states relate to risk taking.  
If the experiments uncover changes in risk preferences due to salience of social comparison, it 
would suggest that the slope value of social preferences utility function, along with the perception 
of one’s position in relation to reference point, would change in response to the changes in 
salience level. These are the two main explanations on why risk taking could possibly change in 
participants. In social preferences model, the slope of the utility function is responsive to the 
salience level, which in turn leads to increased marginal utility and higher risk preference. The 
slope value changes as parameters of the utility function change as depicted in graph 9. Prospect 
theory explanation states, that the subjective perception of the difference between one’s own 
position and reference point increases as the salience of social comparison increases (graph 8). 
Greater difference to reference leads the participants to perceive their position on the value 
function differently in each experiment, resulting in different evaluations of marginal value for 
each level of tangibility. 
Effect of emotions on decision making containing social comparison is less clear. It is not known if 
social comparison leads to changes in emotions and mood states, changes in which lead to 
different preferences in risk taking. Another option is that social comparison in itself causes 
changes in social preferences utility function and perceived position in prospect theory, in addition 
to changes in mood states. These mood state changes then in turn moderate the effects of social 
comparison on risk taking through effects suggested either by the affect infusion model or mood-
maintenance hypothesis. 
Actual execution of the experiment would yield interpretable results and provide information on 
which of the possible result scenarios reviewed would be most plausible. Also, results would tell 
whether it is sensible to include the salience of social comparison into the prospect theory and 
social preferences model’s parameters. 
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Appendix 
Mood mapping questionnaire 
“Please complete the following information and return this form when you are finished.  
Age   ____________ 
Sex   Male / Female  
Years of education ____________ 
How much would you be willing to pay, in order to participate in the following game? You have a 50% 
probability of winning EUR 100 and a 50% probability of getting nothing. 
I would be willing to pay EUR ____ in order to participate in this gamble.” 
 
Participants also charted their mood state by answering the below questions. Order of the questions 
charting mood was random but in this appendix they are grouped with their counterparts. The counterpart 
answers will be reversed and used to deduce the mood of the participant more accurately.  
“Please state on an eight-point scale how accurate you think the following statements are (1 = definitely 
not / 8 = definitely).” 
“I feel happy.” / “I feel sad.” 
“I feel satisfied.” / “I feel sorry.” 
“I feel energetic.” / “I feel tired.” 
“I feel anxious.” / “I feel calm.” 
“I feel tense.” / ”I feel restful.” 
 
